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Palsgraf-ian Proximate Cause and Insurance 
Law: The State of New York Additional 
Insured Coverage Following Burlington 
Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority 
RYAN P. MAXWELL† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Comment is a study of construction accident 
litigation and, in particular, of the insurance coverage 
available to additional insureds under endorsements 
permitted in the state of New York. Specifically, the 
discussion will center around the scope of coverage permitted 
in New York State under the most common additional 
insured endorsements used by insurance companies that 
provide coverage for “liability caused, in whole or in part, by” 
the acts or omissions of the named insured. 
 
† J.D. Candidate, 2019, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.S. Media & 
Communications, 2011, Medaille College; Articles Editor, Buffalo Law Review; 
Law Clerk, Hurwitz & Fine, P.C. I would be remiss if I failed to thank my diligent 
Buffalo Law Review colleagues, who painstakingly poured through these pages 
to a fine polish. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Matthew Steilen for 
providing valuable insight into the artistry that is academic scholarship. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank the talented attorneys comprising the 
Insurance Coverage practice group of Hurwitz & Fine, P.C., for not only 
highlighting the importance of the Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit 
Authority decision for myself and others, but also for actively cultivating both an 
internal and industry-wide inquisitive and collaborative community of insurance 
practitioners, past, present and future.  
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Serving as a catalyst to the commentary that follows is 
the evolution of additional insured precedent currently 
unfolding in New York, and in particular a recent decision 
handed down by the New York Court of Appeals, Burlington 
Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority.1 It is well-
understood that an entity with “additional insured” status 
“enjoy[s] the same protection as the named insured” under a 
policy of insurance.2 However, one must initially determine 
the threshold matter of whether an entity qualifies as an 
“additional insured” under a policy before the insurer owes 
that entity any obligations under its policy. Although the 
exact degree to which additional insured status may be 
extended to general contractors and property owners in New 
York under Burlington remains unclear, the intent of this 
piece is to show that the invocation of “proximate cause,” as 
that term was used by Justice Andrews in his dissent in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,3 carries a certain 
connotation that allows courts to assign financial liability to 
insurers based upon the blameworthiness of individual 
insureds.4 Since additional insured status is arguably 
contingent upon the blameworthiness or level of fault 
attributed to the named insured under a policy of insurance, 
this view would allow Palsgraf-ian proximate cause to sever 
the causal connection necessary to trigger coverage under an 
insurance policy for an entity claiming additional insured 
status as the blameworthy party primarily—and 
substantially—at fault. 
To provide a roadmap, I will approach my analysis of the 
 
 1. 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 2017). 
 2. Pecker Iron Works of N.Y., Inc. v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 786 N.E.2d 863, 864 
(N.Y. 2003); see also Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 703 N.E.2d 
1221, 1226 (N.Y. 1998) (“The [insurance] policy . . . was designed to provide 
primary insurance for [the named insured] and thus, after finding that [the 
owner/lessor] was an additional insured under this policy, it would naturally 
follow that coverage of [the additional insured] was also primary.”). 
 3. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 4. Throughout this piece, I will refer to this concept as “Palsgraf-ian 
proximate cause.” 
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scope of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause in the realm of New 
York insurance law in four distinct parts. Part I consists of a 
brief overview regarding the role that additional insured 
endorsements play in commercial general liability (CGL) 
policies issued to “downstream” entities or subcontractors, as 
well as the evolution of such endorsements and how courts 
have interpreted the language included therein. Part II 
discusses the proximate cause limitations that this language 
imposes upon coverage for general contractors and property 
owners ultimately held solely liable for the injuries and 
damages incurred following construction accidents. At the 
opposite extreme, Part III addresses the broad application of 
additional insured status in regards to an insurer’s duty to 
defend, where liability has yet to be established and the 
allegations in the complaint raise potential liability on behalf 
of the “downstream” subcontractor. Finally, Part IV attempts 
to bridge the divide between an insurer’s broad duty to 
defend, and the lack of additional insured status without 
fault on behalf of the named insured. This final Part 
advances my theory in which the “Palsgraf-ian” proximate 
cause requirement imposed on “liability caused, in whole or 
in part” language in Burlington could potentially sever the 
chain of causation where a subcontractor was tenuously at 
fault. 
I. THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE ADDITIONAL INSURED 
ENDORSEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
In this Part, I will briefly explore the basics of risk 
transfer in the complex and often dangerous area of large-
scale construction projects, including the contractual risk 
transfer provisions between parties and the insurance 
requirements frequently accompanying such contractual 
relationships. Additionally, this Part will dissect the most 
recent changes in the area of standardized additional 
insured provisions and how such provisions have been 
applied by the courts. 
Visit any big city in the world today and you will 
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unavoidably encounter massive, large-scale construction 
projects and real estate development, commercial or 
otherwise. Active worksites are beehives of activity, with 
heavy machines in operation and the use of high-powered 
tools as far as the eye can see. Indeed, 
[c]onstruction is an inherently complex business. Even casual 
observers of the construction process are struck by the enormous 
amount of information required to construct a project. Hundreds, 
even thousands, of detailed drawings are required. Hundreds of 
thousands of technical specifications, requests for information, and 
other documents are needed. Complex calculations are used to 
produce the design. For years, this complexity dictated a labor-
intensive, highly redundant methodology for doing the work. 
Projects were fragmented and broken into many parts. Different 
entities undertook different parts of a project, both for design and 
construction. Therefore, the construction industry became 
exceptionally fragmented. On a project of even average complexity, 
there may have been from 5 to 15 firms involved in design. From 40 
to 100 companies may have been engaged in construction. Many 
more companies supplied materials, professional services, and other 
elements necessary for completion of the project.5 
Although pre-planned and heavily choreographed, these 
complex projects, many times comprising the moving of earth 
and iron, occasionally have unexpected consequences. And 
when such consequences arise, insurance carriers ultimately 
pay the price. But which insurance policy or insurer should 
provide coverage for the accident, injuries, and damages that 
result? Should the subcontractor ultimately be held 
accountable? Was the general contractor solely at fault? 
Were both responsible, either in whole or in part? Should it 
matter? 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the evolution of 
tort law led many to increasingly look beyond fault and some 
courts began concerning themselves with “who was best able 
to reduce the number and cost of injuries, insure against 
them, or redistribute costs in order to spread the burden 
 
 5. 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR 
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 1:2 (2002) (citing John W. Hinchey, Visions for the Next 
Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK § 2.01 [A] (1999)). 
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among all those connected to an enterprise.”6 Among the 
purposes of modern tort law is the imposition of liability on 
those in the best position to secure insurance and provide for 
loss distribution across a broader population, relieving the 
injured party from shouldering the burden themselves.7 But 
this raises an interesting question: To what extent can fault 
be ignored when assigning financial blame for the purposes 
of tort law? Since the financial compensation for injuries 
resulting from accidents does not occur within a vacuum and, 
in many cases, overlapping insurance companies are on the 
hook for ultimate payment of a settlement or monetary 
judgment following litigation, the line for who should be held 
at fault must be drawn somewhere.8 
This approach to modern tort law became increasingly 
relevant after the expansion of tort law during the Industrial 
Revolution. The increase in efficiency through the use of 
dangerous machines during the Industrial Revolution 
sparked significant changes to the modern tort law system; 
chief among them was concern for the safety of the American 
worker. The construction industry with its complexities is 
but one example of an area where such changes to the system 
of tort law and worker safety were deemed necessary.9 
In response to the changes protecting workers, many 
property owners, contractors, and their contractual partners 
sought their own protections from liability in the form of 
insurance coverage and the concept of risk transfer.10 The 
 
 6. DAVID M. ENGEL, THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 10 (John M. Conley 
& Lynn Mather eds., 2016). 
 7. Id. at 15. 
 8. For a theoretical discussion as to where a line could potentially be drawn, 
see discussion infra Part IV. 
 9. Philip L. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, 34 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2007) (“Construction’s complexity has created recognized 
public safety risks, which in turn has led to increased governmental regulation 
of the construction process through legislative imposition of licensing laws, safety 
regulations, and building codes.”). 
 10. See MARSHALL WILSON REAVIS III, INSURANCE: CONCEPTS & COVERAGE 66 
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risk transfer concept dictates that “[a] risk of economic loss 
that could be caused by a particular loss exposure can be 
transferred to another party through a provision in a 
contract.”11 Specifically, within the construction industry, 
[property] owners will compel general contractors to provide trade 
contract indemnity via hold harmless agreements and, perhaps 
more importantly, insurance protection through the requirement 
that the owners be added as additional insureds under identified 
policies of insurance issued to the general contractors. General 
contractors then continue to pass risk down by compelling their 
subcontractors to do the same, naming the general contractor as an 
additional insured in policies where the subcontractor is the named 
insured.12 
Under this model, many, if not most, contractual 
relationships between property owners, general contractors, 
and subcontractors require liability insurance that covers 
defense, settlement, and judgment costs arising from injuries 
on a worksite and shifting liability risks “downstream.”13 
 
(2012). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Dan D. Kohane & Jennifer A. Ehman, Insurance Law, 68 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 914, 930 (2018) (footnote omitted). I am grateful to Dan and Jennifer for 
allowing me to contribute to their New York State Insurance Law Survey 
spanning July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017. Although not a focus of this piece, 
“[a] hold harmless agreement is an example where a [downstream] contractor 
assumes the liability of a building owner [or other contractor] for any loss that 
might occur while the contractor is working on the building.” REAVIS, supra note 
10, at 66. 
 13. See Nicholas N. Nierengarten, New ISO Additional Insured 
Endorsements, 44 BRIEF 30, 31 (2014); Trisha Strode, From the Bottom of the Food 
Chain Looking Up: Subcontractors Are Finding That Additional Insured 
Endorsements Are Giving Them Much More Than They Bargained For, 23 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 697, 702 (2004); see also Terry J. Galganski et al., A 
Construction Lawyer’s Top 10 Additional-Insured Considerations, 30 
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 14 (2010) (“When drafting a contract provision to ensure 
your client is properly named as an additional insured, the following basic rules 
should be followed: (1) as part of the contract negotiating process, the party 
seeking additional-insured status should request a copy of the additional-insured 
endorsement that provides such coverage from the other party, (2) assure the 
most important coverage for an additional insured is obtained through the other 
party’s primary CGL policy, and (3) the contract and the additional-insured 
endorsement should provide that the underlying insurance is primary.”). 
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It is clear that contractual relationships often require a 
“downstream” subcontractor to list its “upstream” general 
contractor(s) and property owner(s) as additional insureds 
under its CGL insurance policy.14 What is less clear of these 
relationships is the extent to which coverage must be 
afforded absent fault on behalf of the subordinate entity. An 
additional insured’s coverage “is typically limited to liability 
arising out of the named insured’s work or 
operations . . . [and] does not provide coverage to an 
additional insured for the additional insured’s own work or 
operations.”15 Most often, CGL policies utilize additional 
insured endorsements published by the Insurance Services 
Office, Inc. (ISO), “an association of approximately 1,400 
domestic property and casualty insurers . . . [and] the almost 
exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL 
insurance,” which “develops standard policy forms and files 
or lodges them with each State’s insurance regulators.”16 
In no sense are additional insured endorsements a new 
concept. The ISO first introduced such additional insured 
endorsements in 1973, originally in two separate varieties 
known as “Form A” and “Form B.”17 These forms were 
developed to fill a need with respect to the extension of 
 
 14. See Strode, supra note 13, at 702; Ellen Chappelle, The Evolution of 
Additional Insured Endorsements, 23 CONSTRUCTION LITIG. 10, 10 (2014). 
 15. 3 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 40:26 (3d ed. 2017). 
 16. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993); see also First 
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 158, 
173 n.17 (D. Conn. 2014); BILL WILSON, WHEN WORDS COLLIDE: RESOLVING 
INSURANCE COVERAGE AND CLAIMS DISPUTES 49 (2018) (stating that, except for 
inland marine insurance forms, “ISO forms tend to dominate the marketplace, 
especially in commercial lines”); Steven G.M. Stein & Jean Gallo Wine, The 
Illusions of Additional Insured Coverage, 34 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 14, 14 (2014) 
(“The influence of the ISO on the language contained in CGL policies cannot be 
overstated, and the majority of CGL policies either follow the ISO forms to the 
letter or draw heavily on language issued by the ISO.”); Strode, supra note 13, at 
703. Not to be forgotten, many insurers issuing property and casualty insurance 
policies use forms issued by the American Association of Insurance Services 
(AAIS) as well. 
 17. James D. O’Connor, Additional Insured Coverage: The Why, The What & 
The Wherefore, 11 J. AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAW. 69, 69 (2017). 
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liability from worksite injuries to property owners and/or 
developers.18 At that point in time, the scope of coverage 
under these forms was significantly limited, with the more 
expansive Form B granting additional insured status to a 
covered entity only with respect to claims reasonably tied to 
the work the named insured was providing the additional 
insured, protecting only direct liability exposure for the 
owner.19 The intended niche that additional insured coverage 
originally sought to fill was readily apparent in the ISO’s use 
of the phrase “owners and lessees,” with “contractors” only 
added several years later in 1985.20 
Since 1973, there have been several iterations of these 
ISO forms, and the application of additional insurance 
provisions, including whether they extend to “direct liability, 
vicarious liability, or something in between,” is dependent 
upon the wording of the particular endorsement used.21 
Some commentators have cautioned that “[i]t is, of course, 
the language of the endorsements which controls, not self-
serving notions circulated in the insurance industry as to 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nierengarten, supra note 13, at 32; see also 4 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK 
J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:338 (2018) 
(“Twenty years ago, additional insured endorsements came in two flavors: the 
short form and the long form. Today there are more flavors than found in a 
Baskin-Robbins ice cream shop. There are endorsements that limit coverage to 
ongoing operations; whereas others cover completed operations. Many 
endorsements have a written agreement requirement, but this also can vary from 
an enforceable written agreement to an ‘insured contract’ as defined by the policy. 
Some policies apply only to liability the additional insured incurs as a result of 
the sole negligence of the named insured. Others are characterized by ‘caused in 
whole or in part’ language.”); JOHN H. MATHIAS, JR. ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE 
DISPUTES § 1.01 (2017) (“The form of the endorsement extending ‘additional 
insured’ status may determine whether coverage is extended to additional 
insureds for liabilities resulting from their own acts or omissions or only for their 
vicarious liability for the acts of the named insured. Thus, care must be used in 
assessing the extent of coverage afforded by virtue of an ‘additional insured’ 
endorsement.”). 
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what the forms were intended to do.”22 In essence, although 
the purpose and intent behind the ISO’s choice of language 
may be relevant to the meaning of the endorsement that is 
crafted, it is the courts that will ultimately determine 
whether the legal interpretations of the policy language are 
all that different than previous iterations used. 
The ISO’s “CG 20 33 07 04” standard form additional 
insured endorsement modifies who is considered an insured 
under a CGL policy, reading in pertinent part: 
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
A. Section II—Who Is An Insured is amended to include as 
an additional insured any person or organization for whom you 
are performing operations when you and such person or 
organization have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement 
that such person or organization be added as an additional 
insured on your policy. Such person or organization is an 
additional insured only with respect to liability for “bodily 
injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising 
injury” caused, in whole or in part, by: 
1. Your acts or omissions; or 
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your 
 
 22. SCOTT C. TURNER, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES 
§ 42:4 (2d ed. 2017). This is not a new concept when it comes to interpreting the 
language in insurance policies, and insurance industry intent is often viewed as 
but one factor in the equation. See, e.g., Tri-Star Theme Builders, Inc. v. 
OneBeacon Ins. Co., 426 F. App’x 506, 512 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The intent of the 
insurance industry draftsmen . . . is not controlling. . . . Such evidence ‘might be 
persuasive if the controversy . . . were between two insurers,’ or if it suggested 
that the language reflected the mutual intent of the parties.”); Randy Maniloff, 
Additional Insured Endorsements: ISO’s Revisions, PUB. LIABILITY, May 2004, at 
M.23-2 (“It is often said—and for good reason—that the analysis of any insurance 
coverage issue must begin with the policy language itself.”); id. at M.23-6 (“The 
real test, of course, is not whether insurers can convince themselves that their 
policy language achieves their drafting intent, but courts. After all, insurers were 
no doubt certain that the predecessors to form CG 20 10 07 04 were perfectly 
suited to achieve the intended result concerning the extent of coverage available 
for additional insureds. And then the black robes had their say.”). But see WILSON, 
supra note 16, at 69 (noting that ISO forms filings can be invaluable extrinsic 
information when interpreting “the intent of policy language”); id. at 101. 
1100 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
behalf . . . .23 
As with many areas of business, the insurance industry 
tends to react as relevant precedent is formulated by the 
courts that modifies the risks involved in “doing an insurance 
business.”24 In accordance with this industry-wide trend, the 
most commonly used “additional insured endorsement[s] 
have evolved over time from broad coverage for the owner’s 
own negligence to narrow coverage for exactly what is 
specified in the construction contract.”25 The “caused, in 
whole or in part, by” language included in the July 2004 
version of the ISO standard form above reflects the ISO’s 
acknowledgement that its prior “arising out of” phrasing had 
been interpreted by courts too broadly.26 Beyond what the 
 
 23. ISO PROPERTIES, INC., ISO COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG 20 
33 07 04 (2004). 
 24. See generally WILSON, supra note 16, at 42 (“[I]nsurers, or form standards 
organizations like the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) . . . do not write 
policies for insureds, but rather they craft and then modify policies for the courts 
that are the ultimate arbiters of coverage. Many policy provisions have already 
been interpreted by the courts, in particular precedent-setting appeals courts. . . . 
[W]hen these appellate courts render interpretations that are either unexpected 
or unintended from the standpoint of the insurance industry, endorsements may 
be issued to tweak a policy term to better clarify the policy language.”). For more 
information regarding the scope of what it means to be conducting a business of 
insurance in New York State, see N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101 (McKinney 2018). 
 25. Chappelle, supra note 14, at 12. 
 26. See Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-2 to M.23-5. Although the “ISO’s 
filing memorandum does not mention by name any of the cases that have 
construed the phrase ‘arising out of’ broadly,” id. at M.23-2, cases like Regal 
Constr. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 930 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 
2010) and Maroney v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 839 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 
2005) are two such examples in New York State, albeit decided subsequent to the 
ISO revisions, since existing insurance policies still contained the outmoded 
endorsements. Interestingly enough, the ISO’s intentions with these revisions 
seem to suggest that they sought to have their cake and eat it too. See Maniloff, 
supra note 22, at M.23-2 (“Ironically, while ISO laments a broad construction of 
the phrase ‘arising out of’ in its additional insured endorsements, insurers have 
benefited from the broad construction that courts have given to the phrase 
‘arising out of’ when it appears in a policy exclusion. Many courts have held that, 
when used in a policy exclusion, the phrase ‘arising out of’ means ‘but for.’ As a 
result, policy-holders have sometimes been left to believe that coverage has been 
improperly denied because of exclusions that have painted with too broad a 
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ISO intended, the broad interpretation by the majority of 
courts was that the phrase “arising out of” extended the 
scope of coverage to encompass an additional insured’s sole 
negligence, so long as the injury was causally connected to 
the business relationship of the named insured and 
additional insureds.27 In an industry where the 
predictability of future risks occurring is central and 
foundational, such a broad interpretation reduced the 
accuracy of the valuation and pricing of coverage premiums: 
Many courts interpreted “arising out of” to be a simple causation 
test and, therefore, afforded direct primary coverage to the 
additional insured. The ISO hope[d] that, by substituting “caused 
by” for “arising out of,” a narrower coverage interpretation will be 
afforded. Moreover, the revised language specifie[d] that coverage 
is afforded the additional insured for liability arising out of the 
named insured’s “acts or omissions,” not simply the named insured’s 
operations. Arguably, the absence of fault on behalf of the named 
insured results in a finding of no coverage for the additional 
insured.28 
 
brush. It seems that what the phrase ‘arising out of’ giveth to insurers in 
exclusions, it taketh away in additional insured endorsements.”). 
 27. Jack P. Gibson & W. Jeffrey Woodward, The 2004 ISO Additional Insured 
Endorsement Revisions, 25 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 5–6 (2005); see also 
Nierengarten, supra note 13, at 32 (“Most courts have held that the phrase 
‘arising out of’ covers both direct and vicarious liability.”); O’Connor, supra note 
17, at 101 (“Courts . . . rejected vicarious liability end-run attempts, reasoning 
that the change in the ‘standard’ form language only sought to put an end to AI 
‘sole negligence’ coverage.”). In fact, many states have statutory provisions 
rejecting any indemnity for the sole negligence of the potential indemnitee, often 
leaving questions pertaining to the enforceability of additional insured 
endorsements that arguably provide such coverage. See generally Allen Holt 
Gwyn & Paul E. Davis, Fifty-State Survey of Anti-Indemnity Statutes and Related 
Case Law, 23 CONSTR. LAW. 26, 28–33 (2003) (providing a grid summarizing the 
anti-indemnity statutes and related case law in all fifty states). 
 28. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:338; see also Patrick J. 
O’Connor, Jr., Recent Developments in Insurance Law, 7 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION 
LAW. 1 (2013) (“The insurance industry developed additional insured 
endorsements that did away with the ‘arising out of” the named insured’s 
operations and replaced it with ‘caused, in whole or in part, by’ the named 
insured. This was done to avoid the ‘fault-free interpretation’ that many courts 
had given the ‘arising out of’ language. On the one hand, the ‘caused, in whole or 
in part, by’ standard is not remarkably more stringent than a fault-free trigger 
for additional insured coverage. If the named insured is arguably one percent at 
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Other commentators and practitioners have shared this 
view, given that “[t]his is, after all, the named insured’s 
policy, and the only way one is supposed to obtain additional 
insured coverage is if there is actual liability on the part of 
the named insured . . . .”29 Generally, the ISO’s CG 20 10 07 
04 form is thought to cover concurrent liability on behalf of 
both the named and additional insureds.30 Additionally, the 
inclusion of “in part” limits coverage for the additional 
insured’s own liability to scenarios in which “the acts or 
omissions of the named insured (or those acting on its behalf, 
such as subcontractors) played at least some part in causing 
the injury or damage at issue[]”:31 
The clear intent of the 2004 modification of both new AI forms was 
to reduce the scope of coverage to the AI and expressly link AI 
coverage to the Named Insured’s own involvement in the acts giving 
rise to the claim against the AI. By conditioning coverage to the AI 
upon the Named Insured’s “causal” behaviors, the new endorsement 
closed the “sole negligence” loophole that had bedeviled the 
 
fault, then coverage, at least a defense obligation, is made out. In practice, 
however, this trigger presents some problems . . . .”); BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra 
note 21, § 11:334 (same); John Liner Organization, Using Additional Insured 
Endorsements, THE JOHN LINER LETTER, Aug. 2004, at 1 (“This filing continues a 
decade-old trend in which ISO and insurers have eroded the value of additional 
insured endorsements. More and more, insurers are making it clear that you 
cannot use an additional insured endorsement as your own insurance policy to 
cover costs unrelated to the negligence of the named insured.”). 
 29. Jeff Sistrunk, NY Ruling Curtails Contractors’ Additional Insured 
Coverage, LAW 360 (June 7, 2017, 10:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/932049/ny-ruling-curtails-contractors-additional-insured-coverage 
(quoting Larry Golub, Partner at Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP). 
 30. Nierengarten, supra note 13, at 32 (“The objective was to eliminate 
coverage for the AI’s sole negligence but continue to provide coverage for the AI’s 
own liability even if the AI’s fault was a major cause, provided that the named 
insured’s activities played some part in the injuries or damages.”); see also 
Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-6 (“[W]hile it is accurate to say in general terms 
that form CG 20 10 07 04 provides coverage for an additional insured for its 
contributory negligence, a review of the policy language reveals that there is an 
important qualification to this intended grant of coverage.”). 
 31. Roberta Anderson, ISO’s 2013 “Additional Insured” Endorsement 
Changes Merit Close Attention, 23 INS. COVERAGE LITIG., May-June 2013, at 33, 
35 (2013). 
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construction industry.32 
To help frame the discussion that follows, it is important 
to understand that the question of whether or not an entity 
is an additional insured under a policy is critical. Unlike non-
coverage by way of a policy exclusion, the lack of additional 
insured status serves to negate the policy’s grant of coverage 
to said entity altogether.33 At the very least, a “complaint 
may need to allege some negligence on the part of the named 
insured to trigger coverage for the additional insured” under 
the ISO’s July 2004 revisions.34 However, such a minimum 
standard of pleading does not answer the full scope of 
coverage to be afforded, if any coverage is to be afforded at 
all. 
As early as May 2006, courts began interpreting the 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language in additional 
insured endorsement language.35 In American Empire 
 
 32. O’Connor, supra note 17; see also John Liner Organization, supra note 28, 
at 2-3 (“ISO and insurers contend that the intent is to primarily cover the 
additional insured’s vicarious liability.”). 
 33. Harco Constr., LLC v. First Mercury Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.S.3d 495, 497–98 
(App. Div. 2017). As an aside, I credit University at Buffalo School of Law Adjunct 
Professor and Legal Practitioner, Dan Kohane, for sharing his aptly named 
“Kohane Coverage Formula,” which establishes that an insurance policy’s 
Coverage = [(WI) – WO)] + CPC, where WI stands for what is initially within the 
coverage of the four corners of the policy (i.e., “what’s in”), WO stands for what 
has been excluded from such initial coverage by the terms of the policy (i.e., 
“what’s out”), and CPC stands for compliance with policy conditions for which 
non-compliance (i.e., a value of zero) may eliminate coverage altogether. Thus, a 
lack of additional insured status would never reach WI, as opposed to being 
removed from coverage by way of an exclusion under WO. See Hurwitz & Fine, 
P.C., Coverage Pointers - Volume IX, No. 24 (May 29, 2008), 
https://www.hurwitzfine.com/news/coverage-pointers-volume-ix-no-24. 
 34. Galganski et al., supra note 13, at 7; see also Maniloff, supra note 22, at 
M.23-6 (“[I]f an additional insured is [alleged to have been] contributorily 
negligent in conjunction with certain parties, but none of which are the named 
insured, then the policy provision requiring that injury or damage be caused in 
part by the named insured (or one acting on its behalf) would not appear to be 
satisfied.”). 
 35. See Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. 
Co., No. Civ. H-06-0004, 2006 WL 1441854, at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2006); see 
also Bruce Smith, Insurance Coverage for Construction Projects, NEB. LAW., April 
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Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty 
Insurance Co.,36 the general contractor for a residential 
construction project, Finger Companies (Finger), 
subcontracted the framing work for the project to Multi 
Building Inc. (Multi).37 As part of their contract, Multi 
agreed to obtain a CGL policy naming Finger as an 
additional insured.38 Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance 
Company (Crum) issued Multi a policy of insurance naming 
as an additional insured “persons or organizations as 
required by written contract [with Multi].”39 The inclusion of 
“as required by written contract” language is common 
practice for CGL policies that are issued in the construction 
industry, making it possible for a single policy of insurance 
to encompass multiple construction contracts and projects 
efficiently, without the need to modify or reissue insurance 
policies for each. 
Unfortunately, the residential construction project was 
not without its share of tragedy. In September 2004, Jose 
Ricardo Romero was killed and Angel Martinez was injured 
when they fell from a makeshift aerial lift comprised of a 
“trash box” affixed to a forklift.40 Suit was filed by Romero’s 
spouse and children in the Southern District of Texas.41 
Subsequently, Romero’s spouse and children amended their 
Petition to allege that both Finger and Multi were 
negligent.42 The outcome of two opposing motions for 
 
2006, at 16, 20 (noting that as of April 2006, no case law had yet interpreted the 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” endorsement revisions). 
 36. 2006 WL 1441854 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2006). 
 37. Id. at *1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *2. 
 42. Id. I note that in this case the Crum policy included the ISO’s CG 20 10 
01 04 that clearly establishes “[t]here is no coverage for the additional insured 
for ‘bodily injury’ . . . arising out of the sole negligence of the additional insured 
or by those acting on behalf of the additional insured.” See American Empire’s 
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summary judgment rested on the meaning of the phrase 
“whole or in part” included in the additional insured 
endorsement of the Crum policy.43 Thus, the district court 
was presented with a question as to whether the “whole or in 
part” language obligated Crum to provide a defense for 
Finger following the plaintiff’s filing of the First Amended 
Petition.44 
The Southern District of Texas was unpersuaded by 
Crum’s interpretation of the endorsement as requiring 
vicarious or derivative liability prior to the extension of 
additional insured status to Finger.45 A reasonable 
interpretation of the language as written indicated that 
additional insured coverage should be afforded where Finger 
and Multi were found jointly liable or negligent.46 The 
absence of the terms “derivative” or “vicarious” meant that 
the liability to which the additional insured endorsement 
applied was based entirely upon the conduct of the named 
 
Memorandum of Law, Am. Empire, 2006 WL 1441854 app. at 85 (No. 4:06-cv-
00004). As the court correctly points out, the “sole negligence” provision is 
inapplicable where the allegations in a petition suggest multiple negligent 
parties throughout its various theories of negligence. Am. Empire, 2006 WL 
1441854, at *4 n. 6; see also, Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-6 (“An interesting 
footnote to form CG 20 10 07 04 is what it does not state. Form CG 20 10 06 04, 
a predecessor to form CG 20 10 07 04, was filed by ISO and then quickly 
withdrawn. The 06 04 version of form CG 20 10 included the following additional 
language: ‘There is no coverage for the additional insured for “bodily injury,” 
“property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” arising out of the sole 
negligence of the additional insured or by those acting on behalf of the additional 
insured.’ Thus, for coverage geneticists, the 06 04 thousand dollar question is 
what gave ISO a problem with including this language in its final revision to form 
CG 20 10 10 01. This writer has a few ideas. However, there is enough to be said 
about the policy language that was ultimately adopted without spending time 
discussing the contents of ISO’s cutting room floor.” (citing Revisions to 
Additional Insured Endorsements, ISO COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORMS 
FILING GL-2004-OFGLA, at 3 (2004))). 
 43. Am. Empire, 2006 WL 1441854, at *4. 
 44. Id. at *6. 
 45. Id. at *6–7. 
 46. Id. at *7 & n.13 (adopting this interpretation and acknowledging in 
footnote thirteen the same reasoning used by Gibson & Woodward, supra note 
27, at 5–6). 
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insured, Multi, and whether or not it was at least partially 
responsible for the injuries sustained.47 Because the 
allegations in the Petition alleged negligence on the part of 
Finger “and/or” Multi, the additional insured endorsement 
was triggered, requiring Crum to honor its defense obligation 
to Finger.48 
Beyond the Southern District of Texas 2006 decision in 
American Empire, the trend of various courts across the 
country has been to restrict independent coverage of 
additional insureds.49 Subsequent to 2006, the language 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” has 
typically [been] interpreted to restrict coverage for additional 
insureds to situations in which the injury was caused, at least in 
part, by the primary policyholder. For example, courts in 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, and New 
Hampshire have held that the “caused by” language in an ISO-
template insurance policy necessitates liability on the part of the 
primary policyholder in order to trigger coverage for the additional 
insured.50 
 
 47. Id. But see John Liner Organization, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that 
“[t]he revised ISO endorsements do not mention ‘vicarious liability,’ but the 
intent is to limit coverage to the additional insured’s exposure to vicarious 
liability and liability from contributory negligence. Some insurers have taken this 
one step further, covering an additional insured only for its vicarious liability.”). 
 48. Am. Empire, 2006 WL 1441854, at *7–8. Interestingly, the Petition in this 
case explicitly alleges that the acts or omissions of Finger “and/or” Multi “taken 
separately and/or collectively, singularly and/or cumulatively, constitute a direct 
and proximate cause of [Romero’s] death.” American Empire’s Memorandum of 
Law, supra note 42, at 219. Since the time of this decision, courts have required 
the establishment of proximate cause before coverage is afforded under an 
additional insured endorsement containing the exact same “caused, in whole or 
in part, by” language. See discussion infra Part II. 
 49. Gary Thompson & Elizabeth Leavy, Your Contract Requires You To Be 




 50. Id. 
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II. ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS IN THE 
VACUUM OF NON-LIABILITY 
There are benefits to exploring questions of critical 
importance in a controlled environment. However, such 
exploration has its limits. Probably the most important of all 
limitations involves the unlikelihood of arriving within such 
a controlled environment in actual practice. And this 
unlikelihood tends to raise more questions than answers 
regarding the application of the resulting precedent. 
This Part introduces the crux of the incursion of 
Palsgraf-ian proximate cause from tort law to the world of 
insurance coverage litigation. The “vacuum of non-liability” 
created in light of a faultless named insured gives rise to the 
heart of my thesis. Although this Part will show how 
simplistic the application of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause is 
where the named insured was not even minimally at fault, it 
is this faultless environment that has catalyzed the 
implementation of this tort concept in the insurance context 
in the first place and has led primarily to this discussion 
regarding just how far the concept can be extended. 
Many of the construction industry lawsuits in New York 
State occur within Manhattan and the Bronx, where job-
related accidents are frequently litigated in New York’s First 
Department.51 The questions that arise in construction 
accident litigation are rarely limited to what adequate 
compensation for an injury will be. Rather, the question is 
usually what combination of entities will be responsible for 
paying such sum upon a finding that compensation is 
warranted. In the world of construction litigation, with the 
layering of contracts and parties, variables such as liability 
are rarely certain—except when they are. A recent New York 
case, Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority,52 
sheds some interesting light on exactly how the ISO’s 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language should be 
 
 51. Kohane & Ehman, supra note 12, at 930. 
 52. 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 2017). 
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interpreted for providing coverage to an additional insured. 
However, it simultaneously raises additional questions. 
Prior to the New York State Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation in Burlington, New York’s First Department 
had interpreted identical additional insured endorsements 
in a series of cases, determining that 
an insurer who agreed to provide additional insured protection was 
obligated to afford such coverage, irrespective of the named 
insured’s negligence, so long as there was some tangential 
relationship between the work performed by the named insured and 
the accident that led to the lawsuit. That was the case even though 
the additional insured endorsements provided that coverage would 
only be provided if the accident was “caused in whole or in part” by 
the acts or omissions of the named insured.53 
Generally, in pre-Burlington New York construction law 
cases, “if [a] subcontractor was involved with [a] loss in a 
more tenuous way, there was a general understanding that 
[additional insured] coverage would likely be 
triggered . . . .”54 Owners and general contractors relied upon 
the adequacy of coverage provided by the “downstream” 
subcontractor’s insurer, and subcontractors merely relayed 
the level of coverage required contractually in its “upstream” 
agreements to its insurer. 
 
 53. Kohane & Ehman, supra note 12, at 930 (footnote omitted); see also Nova 
Cas. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.S.3d 1, 1–2 (App. Div. 2017) 
(“Harleysville is obligated to provide a defense and indemnity for [the additional 
insured], even if Coastal is ultimately found to have no liability in the underlying 
action.”); Aspen Specialty Ins. Co. v. Ironshore Indem. Inc., 42 N.Y.S.3d 121, 122 
(App. Div. 2016) (“While the policy issued by Ironshore to [the named insured] 
refers, with respect to coverage for additional insureds, to ‘losses “caused by” [the 
named insured’s] “acts or omissions” or “operations,” the existence of coverage 
does not depend upon a showing that [the named insured’s] causal conduct was 
negligent or otherwise at fault.”); Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 14 
N.Y.S.3d 377, 384 (App. Div. 2015) (“The loss . . . resulted, at least in part, from 
‘the acts or omissions’ of the [named insured] . . ., regardless of whether the 
[named insured] was negligent or otherwise at fault for his mishap.” (quoting Kel-
Mar Designs, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 8 N.Y.S.3d 304 (App. Div. 
2015))). 
 54. Sistrunk, supra note 29 (third alteration in original) (quoting Suzanne 
Whitehead, Senior Associate at Zelle McDonough & Cohen LLP). 
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That all changed when Burlington reached the New York 
State Court of Appeals. On one particularly unfortunate 
Valentine’s Day in 2009, an employee of the New York City 
Transit Authority (NYCTA), Thomas Kenny, attempted to 
avoid an explosion and fell from an elevated bench wall.55 At 
the time, Kenny had been working around the active 
excavation of a subway tunnel near the Nostrand Avenue 
Subway Station in Brooklyn, New York.56 The explosion 
occurred when an excavation machine operated by Breaking 
Solutions, Inc. (Breaking) struck a live electrical wire that 
was embedded in concrete.57 At all relevant times 
surrounding the accident, NYCTA was leasing the premises 
from the City of New York, and had contracted with 
Breaking to perform demolition work in the subway 
tunnels.58 
Following his fall, Thomas Kenny and his wife, Patricia, 
sued the City of New York and Breaking, seeking 
compensation for his injuries.59 However, in February 2011, 
Breaking filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that Breaking 
bore “no liability for [Kenny’s] accident whatsoever” and that 
 
 55. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 479. 
 56. Id.; Complaint at 2–3, Kenny v. City of New York, 2011 WL 4460598 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-cv-1422) [hereinafter Kenny Complaint]. 
 57. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 479. 
 58. Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598, at *1. 
 59. Id. For a description of the types of injuries (and their extent) which one 
may experience at a construction site, see Kenny Complaint, supra note 56, at 4 
(“[P]laintiff . . . sustained injuries to his limbs and body, and injuries to his 
nervous system, and other systems of his body, shock to his nervous system, 
anxiety, stress, and suffering; has suffered, suffers and will suffer physical pain, 
mental anguish, and the loss of the enjoyment of the pursuits and pleasures of 
life, disruption of the activities of daily living, and other personal injuries; some 
of which are and will be permanent in nature; that plaintiff has received, receives 
and will receive medical, surgical, hospital and health care treatment and care, 
and has and will incur expenses for medical, surgical, hospital, and health care 
providers and health care treatment; and has been, is and will be confined to 
hospital, bed and/or home as a result thereof; plaintiff has lost, and will lose time 
from employment, employment earnings, and/or employment perquisites; all to 
his damage, in a sum, . . . however, not exceeding $10,000,000.00.”). 
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“[t]he true culprit [was] third-party defendant, [NYCTA].”60 
Breaking’s letter indicated that NYCTA had conducted an 
undisputed accident investigation, revealing that during 
NYCTA’s “pre-work inspection of the subject work area, 
NYCTA failed to identify and/or mark-off the subject power 
cables.”61 Moreover, “during [its] pre-work walk-through, the 
NYCTA failed to use electrical detection equipment to locate 
buried power cables. Furthermore, . . . the power cables were 
improperly installed by NYCTA and were not included in any 
power/electrical schematics maintained by NYCTA.”62 A 
separate report prepared by NYCTA indicated that Breaking 
was “operating the equipment properly and had no way of 
knowing that the cables were submerged in the [concrete] 
invert.”63 In response, the Kennys moved to discontinue the 
action against Breaking, and the court dismissed the action 
against Breaking with prejudice by way of stipulation.64 
Accordingly, both the City of New York and Breaking 
Solutions, Inc. stipulated to withdraw their cross-claims 
against one another, which were each subsequently 
dismissed by the court.65 
Breaking was afforded reprieve in the underlying action, 
but as with the bulk of insurance litigation, found its insurer, 
Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington), dragged into 
subsequent litigation regarding who would be financially 
responsible for Mr. Kenny’s injuries.66 Breaking, in 
accordance with NYCTA’s contractual insurance 
requirements, purchased a CGL insurance policy from 
 
 60. Breaking Solutions, Inc. Motion to Dismiss at 1, Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598 
(No. 09-cv-1422). 
 61. Id. at 2. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598, at *4; see also Plaintiff Motion for 
Discontinuance at 1, Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598 (No. 09-cv-1422). 
 65. Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598, at *1 n.1, *4. 
 66. See Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477, 478 (N.Y. 
2017). 
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Burlington that included NYCTA and the City of New York 
as additional insureds under certain conditions.67 As agreed 
to by NYCTA and Breaking, the Burlington policy included 
endorsement language from the latest form issued by the 
ISO, providing that NYCTA and the City of New York were 
additional insureds: 
only with respect to liability for “bodily injury”, “property damage” 
or “personal and advertising injury” caused, in whole or in part, by: 
1. Your acts or omissions; or 
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf.68 
The City of New York, following Thomas Kenny’s filing 
of suit, impleaded NYCTA in the underlying action, 
asserting third-party indemnification and contribution 
claims pursuant to their lease agreement.69 NYCTA 
tendered its defense to Burlington, asserting that it was an 
additional insured under the CGL policy issued to 
Breaking.70 Burlington accepted the defense, but reserved its 
rights to withdraw should NYCTA fail to qualify as an 
additional insured.71 
As stated above, discovery in the underlying lawsuit 
revealed that it was NYCTA’s failure “to identify, mark, or 
protect the electric cable” that ultimately led to the 
employee’s injuries.72 The stipulation leading to the 
dismissal of Kenny’s lawsuit against Breaking with prejudice 
prompted Burlington’s disclaimer of coverage for NYCTA, 
asserting that without fault on behalf of its named insured, 
Breaking, NYCTA was not an additional insured under the 
 
 67. Id. at 479. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (“Under article VI, § 6.8 of that lease agreement, NYCTA agreed to 
indemnify the City for liability ‘arising out of or in connection with the operation, 
management[,] and control by the [NYCTA]’ of the leased property.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 479–80. 
 72. Id. at 480. 
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policy.73 In other words, “Burlington denied coverage to 
NYCTA . . . on the grounds that [it] w[as] not [an] additional 
insured[] within the meaning of the policy because NYCTA 
was solely responsible for the accident that caused the 
injury.”74 Regardless of such findings, under previous 
iterations of the ISO’s additional insured endorsements, such 
fault would be irrelevant, as the incident had occurred within 
the course of Breaking’s ongoing operations for the NYCTA 
project. However, this was not your father’s CGL policy,75 but 
rather the most recent iteration which included the “caused, 
in whole or in part, by” terminology. 
In this significant New York insurance decision, 
Burlington commenced a declaratory judgment action 
against NYCTA, seeking a judicial determination that 
NYCTA was not owed coverage as an additional insured 
under the CGL policy issued to Breaking.76 The New York 
State Supreme Court granted Burlington’s motion for 
summary judgment, agreeing that NYCTA could not be an 
additional insured unless the named insured, Breaking, was 
negligent.77 The New York State Appellate Division, First 
Department, reversed, concluding that “the named insured 
was not negligent, but ‘the act of triggering the 
explosion . . . was a cause of [the employee’s] injury’ within 
the meaning of the policy.”78 The New York State Court of 
Appeals granted Burlington leave to appeal.79 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 478–79. 
 75. This pays homage to Oldsmobile’s (in)famous ad slogan “not your father’s 
Oldsmobile.” Coincidentally, the year 2004 marked the end for both General 
Motors’ Oldsmobile and the ISO’s “arising out of” version of additional insured 
endorsement. 
 76. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 480. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 14 N.Y.S.3d 377, 
382 (App. Div. 2015). 
 79. Id.; see also Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 56 N.E.3d 898 (N.Y. 
2016) (granting leave to appeal). 
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Burlington maintained that “under the plain meaning of 
the endorsement NYCTA . . . [is] not [an] additional 
insured[] because the acts or omissions of the named insured, 
[Breaking], were not a proximate cause of the injury” and 
thus “the coverage does not apply where, as here, the 
additional insured was the sole proximate cause of the 
injury.”80 In opposition, NYCTA asserted that the express 
terms of the endorsement applied to “any act or omission by 
[Breaking] that resulted in injury, regardless of the 
additional insured’s negligence” and “that [Breaking’s] 
operation of its excavation machine provided the requisite 
causal nexus between injury and act to trigger coverage 
under the policy.”81 
The Court of Appeals at length dissected the differences 
between “but for” causation, or causation in fact, and 
“proximate” or “legal” cause.82 Where “but for” causation is 
“[t]he cause without which the event could not have 
occurred,”83 liability only extends as far as it is assigned by 
the Court, and “because of convenience, . . . public policy, 
[and] a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to 
trace a series of events beyond [its proximate cause].”84 
Interestingly, the New York Court of Appeals used 
proximate cause language from Palsgraf v. Long Is. Railroad 
Co.85 This “Palsgraf-ian” style proximate cause, famously 
included in the dissenting opinion of Justice Andrews, legally 
severs the chain of liability without regard to the possibility 
 
 80. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 480–81. 
 81. Id. at 481 (emphasis in original). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting But-For Cause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 84. Id. (citing Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149–
50 (N.Y. 1978) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 
1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting))). 
 85. Id. 
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of an actual causal connection or actual fault.86 In theory, 
such an application of “Palsgraf-ian” proximate cause in the 
context of additional insured coverage may allow for the 
possibility of the elimination of coverage where the named 
insured is even one-percent at fault.87 
Continuing on these principles, Burlington’s use of the 
language “‘caused, in whole or in part’ [by Breaking]” in the 
policy endorsement required the Court to distinguish 
between mere “but-for” causes and the “proximate,” legal 
cause of the injuries sustained, “since ‘but for’ causation 
cannot be partial.”88 The Court determined that the “words—
‘in whole or in part’—can only modify ‘proximate cause.’”89 
Moreover, with Burlington’s use of the term “liability,” that 
requires a showing of fault, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that if additional insured coverage is afforded “only with 
respect to liability,” then the language “caused, in whole or 
in part, by” restricts such coverage to damage caused by the 
negligent or otherwise actionable “acts or omissions” of 
 
 86. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, 
J., dissenting). 
 87. See Peter N. Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law 
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles”, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 1, 34 (2007). However, in practice, such a legal determination that 
would allow for the denial of coverage on behalf of any insured is asking a lot, 
given the public policy concerns of compensating the injured and rejecting 
unnecessary forfeiture of coverage. I stress that such a determination would need 
to be made under the right factual scenario, and caution that in selecting just 
such a scenario, one must remember the old adage that “bad facts make bad law.” 
This is especially true in an insurance industry and context that is, at its core, 
concerned with the predictability of the happening of covered risks. 
 88. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 482. 
 89. Id. But cf. Sistrunk, supra note 29 (“Attorneys who represent 
policyholders said the majority’s decision to interpret the additional insured 
endorsement as requiring a proximate cause standard, even though those exact 
words don’t appear in the provision, marks a departure from well-established 
policy interpretation principles. . . . ‘For the court to put “proximately” in there, 
it added a word to a contract that was already written and, not only that, it is a 
word with great legal significance,’ said Anderson Kill PC shareholder Allen R. 
Wolff.”). 
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Breaking.90 Applying the facts at issue to these causation 
principles, the Court held that 
[Breaking] was not at fault. The employee’s injury was due to 
NYCTA’s sole negligence in failing to identify, mark, or deenergize 
the cable. Although but for [Breaking’s] machine coming into 
contact with the live cable, the explosion would not have occurred 
and the employee would not have fallen or been injured, that 
triggering act was not the proximate cause of the employee’s 
injuries since [Breaking] was not at fault in operating the machine 
in the manner that led it to touch the live cable.91 
Without fault on behalf of the named insured, Breaking, 
the Court of Appeals reversed the First Department and 
granted Burlington’s motion for summary judgment, 
agreeing that the insurer did not owe NYCTA coverage as an 
additional insured under the policy.92 
The holding in Burlington was indeed consistent with 
the goal of the ISO to eliminate a fault-free interpretation of 
coverage.93 Following the Court of Appeals decision in 
Burlington, it was anticipated by those involved in insurance 
litigation that construction contracting and insurance in the 
state of New York would be significantly impacted. As a 
 
 90. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 482. But see id. at 483 (agreeing with the dissent 
that the language “caused . . . by” does not necessitate negligence on behalf of the 
named insured before additional insured coverage is to be afforded). 
Interestingly, the Court of Appeals neglected to decide that “negligence” must be 
found on behalf of the named insured. Some commentators have suggested that 
the ISO’s lack of use of the term “negligence” in relation to the “acts or omissions” 
that must give rise to liability may have been on purpose, so as to prevent the 
exclusion of “intentional” acts giving rise to liability and fault on behalf of the 
named insured. DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., THE ADDITIONAL INSURED BOOK 200 
n.2 (6th ed. 2011) (“The reference to acts rather than negligent acts of the named 
insured is necessary because endorsement CG 20 10 applies to personal and 
advertising injury as well as bodily injury and property damage. Personal and 
advertising injury offenses may constitute volitional or intentional conduct where 
no negligence is involved. For the same reason, coverage exists for the additional 
insured with respect to bodily injury and property damage, even if that injury or 
damage results from the named insured’s intentional (rather than negligent) 
act.”). 
 91. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 484. 
 92. Id. at 485–86. 
 93. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:338. 
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result of the decision, “[l]arge general contractors or owners 
that thought they were getting additional insured coverage 
for their own fault under this endorsement are no longer 
going to get that in New York,” and instead, “there is only 
[additional insured] coverage if the downstream 
subcontractor is actually at fault.”94 Many of those 
“upstream” in this new, post-Burlington, reality have 
considered adjusting contracted insurance requirements to 
explicitly provide the broadly interpreted “arising out of” 
language of additional insured coverage afforded in the ISO’s 
10 01 form that had allowed for mere “but for” causal 
connection arising under the ongoing operations of the 
“downstream” subcontractor.95 
Under the same “caused, in whole or in part, by” 
language, other courts have confronted questions similar to 
those faced by the New York Court of Appeals in Burlington. 
But again, how frequently is the issue of liability readily 
eliminated for the named insured at the outset of litigation 
following a construction accident and lawsuit? Interestingly, 
the Superior Court of Massachusetts in Leahy v. Lighthouse 
Masonry, Inc.96 confronted a very similar scenario to that in 
Burlington, where all liability for the named insured had 
been ruled out, and the court was left to interpret “caused, in 
whole or in part, by” language in a vacuum. 
In Leahy, an employee of General Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. (GMC), Vincent Leahy, was seriously 
injured by a large limestone panel that fell off a building.97 
The general contractor for the construction project, Daniel 
 
 94. Sistrunk, supra note 29 (quoting David Wood, partner at Barnes & 
Throngburg LLP). 
 95. Julian D. Ehrlich, Reaction and Overreaction to ‘Burlington v. NYC 
Transit Auth.’, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 27, 2018, 02:30 PM), https://www.law.com 
/newyorklawjournal/2018/02/27/reaction-and-overreaction-to-burlington-v-nyc-
transit-auth/. 
 96. No. MICV201100151, 2014 WL 7405931 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 2, 2014). 
 97. Id. at *1. All parties involved no doubt found themselves between the 
proverbial rock and a hard place. 
2018] ADDITIONAL INSURED COVERAGE 1117 
O’Connell’s Sons, Inc. (O’Connell), had contracted with GMC 
to install the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning on 
site.98 The contract required GMC to obtain a CGL policy 
that named O’Connell as an additional insured, and GMC 
obtained such a policy from Peerless Insurance Company 
(Peerless).99 
Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. (Lighthouse), another 
subcontractor, was responsible for installing limestone 
panels on the exterior wall of the building.100 While Mr. 
Leahy was on break below, a Lighthouse foreman 
accidentally dislodged a limestone panel installed days 
earlier, which subsequently fell and seriously injured Mr. 
Leahy.101 O’Connell’s site superintendent had personally 
walked through the area of the accident two or three times 
that morning and believed that it was a safe place for 
employees to take their break since no overhead work was 
being performed there.102 The undisputed facts of the case 
show that Mr. Leahy’s injuries were caused by Lighthouse, 
or at the very least not by GMC.103 Lighthouse ultimately 
settled claims covered by its CGL and excess liability 
insurers for $7,250,000.104 
The Peerless CGL policy provided that additional 
insured coverage should be afforded to “O’Connell for any 
liability that is ‘caused, in whole or in part, by . . . acts or 
omissions’ of GMC.”105 The court acknowledged that the 
phrase “caused by” in an insurance policy “embodies the 
concept of proximate causation.”106 In the insurance context, 
 
 98. Id. at *3. 
 99. Id. at *5. 
 100. Id. at *3. 
 101. Id. at *4. 
 102. Id. at *3. 
 103. Id. at *8. 
 104. Id. at *4. 
 105. Id. at *8. 
 106. Id.; see also United Nat’l Ins. v. Parish, 717 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Mass. App. 
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the court explained, 
[w]hen an insurance policy covers and indemnifies an insured for 
losses “caused by” a certain category of events, the scope of coverage 
must be determined based on whether “the efficient proximate 
cause of the loss” is within that category of events. Under such an 
insurance provision, a loss is “caused by” the event “that sets in 
motion a train of events which brings about a result without the 
intervention of any force stated and working actively from a new 
and independent source,” which in legal jargon we call “the direct 
and proximate cause” of the loss. “Remote causes of causes are not 
relevant to the characterization of an insurance loss. In the context 
of this commercial litigation, the causation inquiry stops at the 
efficient physical cause of the loss; it does not trace events back to 
their metaphysical beginnings.”107 
Since it was undisputed that Mr. Leahy’s injuries were 
caused by the acts or omissions of Lighthouse, rather than 
GMC, the court held that Peerless had no obligation to 
indemnify under either its CGL policy or umbrella liability 
policy, where the umbrella liability policy was wholly 
contingent upon the existence of CGL coverage.108 
III. “CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY” AND THE BROAD 
DUTY TO DEFEND 
In both Burlington and Leahy, the determination of 
liability for the named insured had been made prior to any 
need for the courts to analyze the insurer’s duty to indemnify 
any potential additional insureds under the policy, because 
no entity qualified without fault on behalf of the named 
insured. Since the insurer’s duty to indemnify was clearly 
non-existent for the general contractor and property owner, 
the insurer was also not required to provide any defense for 
litigation, simply because they were not insured under the 
policy. But outside of such “controlled environment” 
litigation, where the named insured is even one-percent at 
 
Div. 1999) (determining that “arising out of” has a broader meaning than “caused 
by”). 
 107. Leahy, 2014 WL 7405931 at *8 (citations omitted). 
 108. Id. 
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fault, how should courts handle an insurer’s broad duty to 
defend? 
In this Part, practitioners are reminded to evaluate 
coverage disputes responsibly. For every evaluation of an 
insurer’s duty to indemnify, it is necessary to evaluate an 
insurer’s duty to defend. The limitations of Palsgraf-ian 
proximate cause are further clouded by the breadth of 
disparity between the two. 
When purchasing an insurance policy that provides 
coverage for certain risks, the insured actually purchases 
both “liability insurance” and “litigation insurance.”109 Both 
coverages extend to any person or entity that meets the 
policy’s definition of an “insured,” including an additional 
insured.110 Generally, the duty of an insurer to pay for the 
defense costs of its insured is broader than any obligation 
that the insurer may have to indemnify that insured.111 It is 
well understood in insurance litigation that courts look to the 
allegations levied against an insured in making a 
determination regarding the insurer’s duty to defend.112 
Specifically, “[t]he duty to defend is measured against the 
allegations of pleadings but the duty to pay is determined by 
 
 109. See Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cook, 850 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (N.Y. 2006); 
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272, 274–75 (N.Y. 1984); Int’l Paper 
Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 320 N.E.2d 619, 621 (N.Y. 1974) (“While policy coverage . . . 
is often referred to as ‘liability insurance’ it is clear that it is, in fact, ‘litigation 
insurance’ as well.”). 
 110. PLITT ET AL., supra note 15, § 40:29. 
 111. Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 77 N.E.2d 131, 133 (N.Y. 1948) 
(“[E]ven in cases where the policies do not render the allegations by the injured 
party controlling, it has been said: ‘The distinction between liability and coverage 
must be kept in mind. So far as concerns the obligation of the insurer to defend 
the question is not whether the injured party can maintain a cause of action 
against the insured but whether he can state facts which bring the injury within 
the coverage. If he states such facts the policy requires the insurer to defend 
irrespective of the insured’s ultimate liability.’”). 
 112. Prashker v. U.S. Guarantee Co., 136 N.E.2d 871, 875 (N.Y. 1956) (“The 
circumstance that some grounds are alleged in the complaints in the negligence 
actions which would involve the insurance company in liability is enough to call 
upon it to defend these actions.”); see also Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 N.E.2d 
484, 486–87 (N.Y. 1956). 
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the actual basis for the insured’s liability to a third 
person.”113 This defense obligation encompasses allegations 
no matter how “groundless, false or fraudulent.”114 Because 
of these vastly different thresholds to the defense and 
indemnity obligations, a court would relieve an insurer of its 
duty to defend “only if it could be concluded as a matter of 
law that there [was] no possible factual or legal basis on 
which [the insurer] might eventually be held to be obligated 
to indemnify . . . under any provision of the insurance 
policy . . . .”115 An example pertinent to our analysis would be 
a finding that an entity was neither a named, nor additional 
insured under the policy, whereby no coverage or indemnity 
obligation would exist under the policy as a matter of law.116 
Although cases like Burlington, Leahy and their kin 
 
 113. Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441, 444 
(N.Y. 1985). 
 114. BP Air Conditioning Corp. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 871 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 
(N.Y. 2007) (quoting Servidone Constr. Corp., 477 N.E.2d at 444); see also James 
G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 126 A.3d 753, 762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2015) (“[T]he underlying tort suit need only allege action that is potentially 
covered by the policy, no matter how attenuated, frivolous, or illogical that 
allegation may be.”). 
 115. Spoor-Lasher Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 352 N.E.2d 139, 140 (N.Y. 
1976); see also MATHIAS ET AL., supra note 21, § 8.01 (“By definition, an insurer 
need indemnify its policyholder only for those claims that actually are covered by 
the policy. In contrast, any action asserting claims that may potentially fall 
within the coverage of the policy gives rise to the duty to defend. The same 
standard for determining the duty to defend applies to additional insureds as to 
the primary named insured.” (first emphasis added)). 
 116. See, e.g., Worth Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 888 N.E.2d 1043, 1045–
46 (N.Y. 2008) (declining to afford a general contractor additional insured status 
under a subcontractor’s insurance policy where the injured party conceded claims 
of negligence against the subcontractor were without factual merit); see also 
MATHIAS ET AL., supra note 21, § 8.01 (“If an insurer can show that there clearly 
would be no coverage for the ultimate liability, or that the claim is subject to a 
clear policy exclusion, no duty to defend exists.”); Alan J. Pierce, Insurance Law, 
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 887, 891 (2009) (“[A]dditional insured coverage does not 
extend to circumstances where the additional insured concedes, or it has been 
determined that the named insured was not negligent and the named insured is 
not on the work site at the time of the injury.”). Although Worth involved the pre-
2004 ISO language “arising out of,” it establishes that without insured status of 
some kind, there is no defense obligation. 
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appear to convey a definitive rule for interpreting the 
language “caused, in whole or in part, by,” they fail to 
address how courts apply proximate cause where liability is 
less certain. On the opposite extreme, where courts have 
been asked to determine whether an insurer must defend an 
entity under an additional insured endorsement and the 
named insured’s liability remains uncertain, courts are often 
reluctant to eliminate an insurer’s broad defense 
obligation.117 
In Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., a 
construction company, Pro Con, Inc. (Pro Con), was the 
general contractor for the construction of a college hockey 
rink.118 After subcontracting with Canatal Industries Inc. 
(Canatal) for structural steel work, Canatal, in turn, 
subcontracted with CCS Constructors, LLC (CCS) for the 
actual steel erection.119 Pursuant to the terms of the contract 
between the subcontractors, CCS was required to (and 
ultimately did) procure a CGL policy from Interstate Fire 
and Casualty Company (Interstate) under which Canatal, 
Pro Con, and Bowdoin College were named as additional 
 
 117. See First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 48 
F. Supp. 3d 158 (D. Conn. 2014); Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 794 
F. Supp. 2d 242 (D. Me. 2011); Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Empire Steel Erectors, No. 
H-08-1707, 2010 WL 4791493, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010); see also Maniloff, 
supra note 22, at M.23-8 (“As a result of a sue-first-and-gather-the-facts-later 
pleading strategy, the underlying plaintiff’s suit is likely to name several 
potentially negligent parties, in addition to the actually negligent party (the 
additional insured). Thus, even if it is ultimately determined that the additional 
insured was solely responsible for the injuries, or contributorily negligent—but 
not in conjunction with the named insured, the additional insured will likely 
secure a defense. This will likely be accomplished by the additional insured citing 
the duty to defend standard and pointing to the allegations in the underlying 
complaint that the plaintiff’s injury was caused in whole or in part by the named 
insured’s acts or omissions, or of those acting on its behalf, as required by form 
CG 20 10 07 04. And as insurers know all too well—especially those involved in 
construction losses—the duty to defend is frequently far more costly than the 
duty to indemnify.”). 
 118. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 245. 
 119. Id. 
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insureds.120 
In the dead of winter, a CCS crane operator, Stephen E. 
Williams, fell and was injured after he slipped on snow-
covered plastic insulating blankets installed by Pro Con at 
the Bowdoin College construction site.121 Although the 
accident occurred in the course of Mr. Williams’ work for 
CCS, Pro Con may have been advised prior to his fall that 
frost blankets were dangerous.122 Mr. Williams filed suit 
against Pro Con, alleging negligent failure to maintain 
reasonably safe working conditions on site.123 Pro Con 
responded by alleging Mr. Williams was comparatively 
negligent, filing a third-party action against Canatal for 
contractual and common law indemnity, and filing a fourth-
party suit against CCS alleging that CCS was obligated to 
indemnify Canatal.124 
Subsequently, Pro Con’s insurer, American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG) tendered Pro Con’s defense 
and indemnity to CCS and its insurer, Interstate,125 which 
was rejected.126 Interstate’s investigation indicated that 
 
 120. Id. at 245–46. 
 121. Id. at 248. 
 122. See id. (“Following Williams’ accident, on December 10, 2007, Terry 
Carpenter, CCS’s superintendent on the Bowdoin Project, sent Pro Con a letter 
reiterating what he characterized as a prior request that the frost blankets 
covering the building perimeter in CCS’s work area be removed in order to 
prevent further injuries.” (emphasis added)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 248–49; see also Blecker Aff. Ex. B, Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d 242 
(No. 21-3) (tendering Pro Con’s defense and indemnity to Interstate via certified 
letter). As an aside, AIG’s tender letter on behalf of Pro Con solely relies upon 
Mr. Williams’ employment by CCS as the basis for the assertion that “the incident 
arose out of CCS’ work.” Id. However, the language “arising out of” in the ISO’s 
standard additional insured endorsement was modified to “caused, in whole or in 
part, by” in 2004 specifically to create more stringent standards of causation that 
must apply before coverage is afforded under a policy. Maniloff, supra note 22, at 
M.23-5; see also discussion infra Part IV (regarding Pioneer Cent. Sch. Dist. v. 
Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.). 
 126. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 249; see also Blecker Aff. Ex. F, Pro Con, 794 
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Mr. Williams slipped and fell while exiting the crane he was 
operating. The fall was due to the fact that Pro Con had placed, or 
requested to be placed, insulated blanket ground cover around the 
job site work area which was then covered with snow. This created 
the slippery condition that was the cause of the accident.127 
Thus, relying upon its investigation, Interstate rejected 
the tender because the accident was confirmed not to have 
been “caused in whole or in part by” the CCS’s acts or 
omissions.128 
In assessing whether Interstate had a duty to defend Pro 
Con, the District of Maine interpreted the policy’s additional 
insured endorsement as “plainly requir[ing] that there be 
some connection between the operations on behalf of the 
Additional Insured (i.e., Pro Con) and the Named Insured 
(i.e., CCS).”129 Relying on this interpretation and reviewing 
the language in the underlying complaint, the court 
determined that Mr. Williams “was performing work within 
the scope and course of his employment with CCS when he 
was injured,” and thus Pro Con’s potential for liability arose 
out of CCS’s operations.130 Combined with the fact that the 
complaint was void of reference to Pro Con’s installation of 
the tarps, the court held that “[f]rom these allegations, 
there . . . is certainly the potential that . . . the fact finder 
[might] determin[e] that Williams’ bodily injuries were 
caused, at least in part by, the acts or omissions of CCS (or 
its agents) in the performance of these operations.”131 
 
F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 21-7) (notifying AIG via certified letter of Interstate’s 
rejection of AIG’s tender of defense and indemnity on behalf of Pro Con). 
 127. Blecker Aff. Ex. F, supra note 126, at 1. 
 128. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 249; see also Blecker Aff. Ex. F, supra note 
126, at 2. 
 129. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 254. But see Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mo. 
Highways & Transp. Comm’n, No. 4:12-CV-01484-NKL, 2014 WL 4594207, at 
*12 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (acknowledging that the use of “caused by” language in an 
endorsement requires more than the establishment of a “simple causal 
relationship” between the injury and the activity of the insured, but rather 
something more closely resembling proximate cause in general tort law). 
 130. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 254. 
 131. Id. at 257. 
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The analysis in Pro Con is but one example of the 
problem courts have in interpreting “caused, in whole or in 
part, by” language in the context of the broad duty to defend. 
Similarly, the District of Connecticut in First Mercury 
Insurance Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc.132 
encountered the application of an additional insured 
endorsement to an insurer’s duty to defend. In First Mercury, 
the catastrophic collapse of a steel web structure during its 
installation at Yale University’s Science Area Chilled Water 
Plant Shell caused injuries to several Fast Trek Steel (Fast 
Trek) employees, including the death of Robert F. Adrian.133 
The general contractor for the project, Shawmut 
Woodworking & Supply, Inc. (Shawmut), had subcontracted 
the steel fabrication and construction work to Shepard Steel 
Company (Shepard).134 Shepard, in turn, subcontracted the 
steel erection portion of work to Fast Trek.135 As required by 
contract, Fast Trek obtained a CGL insurance policy from 
First Mercury that included both Shawmut and Shepard as 
“additional insureds.”136 
Following the collapse and injuries, the injured Fast 
Trek employees and Mr. Adrian’s estate filed suit against 
Shawmut and Shepard, who tendered their defenses to First 
Mercury and demanded indemnity pursuant to the 
Additional Insured Endorsement in its policy issued to Fast 
 
 132. 48 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 30 (2d Cir. 2016). 
I note the important distinction between the New York Court of Appeals decision 
in Burlington, which solely addresses an insurer’s duty to indemnify, and the 
First Mercury decision, pertaining only to an insurer’s broad duty to defend. 
However, First Mercury provides an interesting discussion of the “caused, in 
whole or in part, by” language in relation to both “proximate cause” and “vicarious 
liability,” and is included for this purpose. 
 133. Id. at 160. See generally Egidio DiBenedetto, 1 Dead, 3 Injured in Science 
Park Construction Accident, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2010, 2:18 AM), 
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2010/09/14/1-dead-3-injured-in-science-park-
construction-accident/ (detailed description of incident). 
 134. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 160. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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Trek.137 The endorsement in the First Mercury Policy 
provides coverage for 
any person or organization for whom you are performing operations 
when you and such person or organization have agreed in writing 
in a contract or agreement that such person or organization be 
added as an additional insured on your policy. Such person or 
organization is an additional insured only with respect to liability 
for “bodily injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising 
injury” caused, in whole or in part, by 
1. Your acts or omissions; or 
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf; in the 
performance of your ongoing operations for the additional 
insured.138 
First Mercury contended, inter alia, that the language 
“only with respect to liability for ‘. . . injury’ caused, in whole 
or in part, by,” required it to provide a defense to Shawmut 
and Shepard “only for instances where vicarious liability is 
imputed to [Shawmut and/or Shepard] as a result of acts or 
omissions of Fast Trek, apart from their own independent 
acts or omissions.”139 However, the district court declined to 
add language to First Mercury’s policy endorsement that was 
not included in the express language of the policy, refusing 
to modify “liability” to “vicarious liability.”140 
Moreover, the district court noted that the limitation to 
“liability” proposed by First Mercury would fail to give effect 
to the phrase “in whole or in part.”141 “Vicarious liability” 
 
 137. Id. at 160–61 (“Liberty Mutual is . . . providing a defense to Shepard and 
Shawmut under a reservation of rights and has made demand upon First 
Mercury to assume that defense, . . . maintaining that First Mercury has a duty 
to defend Shawmut and Shepard as additional insureds under the policy issued 
by First Mercury.”). 
 138. Id. at 163–64; see also Liberty Mutual Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F at 3–4, First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 
3d 158 (No. 3:12-cv-01096) (adopting the 2004 version of the ISO’s standard CGL 
Additional Insured Endorsement, CG 20 33 07 04). 
 139. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 172. 
 140. See id. at 172–73. 
 141. Id. at 172. 
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would be incompatible with the “caused, in whole or in part, 
by” language, because “vicarious liability is an all or nothing 
proposition and thus a party could not be vicariously liable 
‘in part’ for Fast Trek’s acts.”142 Relying on the District of 
Maine’s reasoning in Pro Con, which interpreted identical 
endorsement language, the District of Connecticut agreed 
that “the insurer, ‘by including the language “in whole or in 
part” in [the additional insured provision], specifically 
intended coverage for additional insureds to extend to 
occurrences attributable in part to acts or omissions by both 
the named insured and the additional insured.’”143 
The District of Connecticut in First Mercury continued 
by addressing the history of modifications to the ISO’s 
additional insured endorsement.144 Reacting to a history of 
additional insured status extensions to entities for their sole 
negligence, the ISO in 2004 replaced the language “arising 
out of the named insured’s acts or omissions” in its standard 
additional insured endorsement with the language “caused, 
in whole or in part, by” the named insured’s acts or 
omissions.145 The change to the “caused . . . by” language 
eliminated coverage for the sole negligence of an additional 
insured, and was interpreted to “require proximate causation 
by the insured rather than simply but-for causation.”146 
Since “liability” was included in both versions of the 
endorsement, it was interpreted to be a factor in the 
causation determination, contrary to First Mercury’s 
“vicarious liability” contention.147 
 
 142. Id. at 173. 
 143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. 
Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 242, 256–57 (D. Me. 2011)). 
 144. Id. at 173–74. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 174. 
 147. Id.; see also Royal Indem. Co. v. Terra Firma, Inc., 948 A.2d 1101 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006) (interpreting “liability” in the same manner, as a piece of the 
causation question), aff’d and adopted by 947 A.2d 913 (Conn. 2008). 
2018] ADDITIONAL INSURED COVERAGE 1127 
The District of Connecticut consulted the Pro Con, Inc. 
decision, which had conducted a similar discussion regarding 
variations in the exact additional insured endorsement 
language utilized and, more specifically, the impact when 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language was included.148 
Whereas the express language included in endorsements 
analyzed in the recent past had plainly called for “vicarious 
liability”149 or excluding coverage for claims based on the sole 
negligence of the additional insured,150 such cases did not 
include “caused, in whole or in part, by” language. The 
District of Maine instead relied upon recent federal court 
decisions analyzing that language in particular, requiring 
that the named insured be at least a proximate cause of the 
injuries.151 
 
 148. See Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255–
58 (D. Me. 2011). 
 149. See MacArthur v. O’Connor Corp., 635 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.R.I. 2009) 
(“Vicarious liability by definition is ‘liability that a supervisory party . . . bears 
for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate . . . based on the 
relationship between the two parties.’ This definition comports exactly with the 
language of the additional insured endorsement because [the additional insured] 
is only covered in those instances when they are liable for the conduct of [the 
named insured], their subordinate.” (citation omitted)). 
 150. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48 
(D. Me. 2001) (“Based on the certificate [providing that the general contractor] 
was an additional insured but only with respect to liability arising out of the 
negligent acts or omissions of the [named insured,] . . . in no event would [the 
general contractor] be entitled to coverage under the [insurance policy] for bodily 
injury arising out of [the general contractor’s] own acts or omissions.”). 
 151. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 256–57; see also Dale Corp. v. Cumberland 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 09-1115, 2010 WL 4909600, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2010) 
(finding that the allegations in the underlying complaint did not “trigger [the 
insurer’s] duty to defend because they do not in any way implicate [the named 
insured] as required by the additional insured endorsement,” which required a 
showing that the injuries were caused “in whole or in part” by the named 
insured’s negligence); Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Empire Steel Erectors, L.P., No. H-08-
1707, 2010 WL 4791493, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) (“The new . . . 
additional insured endorsement requires the injury to be ‘caused, in whole or in 
part, by’ the named insured in order for coverage to be triggered. Thus, in the 
absence of fault of the named insured, there should be no coverage for an 
additional insured. . . . The inference [in the underlying state petition] that [the 
employee] was at least partly at fault in causing his own injuries is sufficient to 
trigger the duty to defend under the [insurer’s] policy.” (citations omitted)). 
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Following this interpretation of “caused, in whole or in 
part, by” as requiring proximate cause, the District of 
Connecticut concluded 
that Shawmut’s and Shepard’s “liability” must be “caused, in whole 
or in part” by Fast Trek’s acts or omissions means that coverage 
under the Additional Insured Endorsement is not limited to 
Shawmut’s and Shepard’s vicarious liability for Fast Trek’s acts or 
omissions but instead refers more broadly to liability that is caused, 
at least in part, by Fast Trek, but excludes situations involving only 
the independent acts of negligence of the additional insureds.152 
Contrary to the insurer in Burlington, whose insured 
was found without fault following NYCTA internal reports 
on the incident, First Mercury was on notice from an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration report that 
Fast Trek was at least partially at fault for the accident.153 
Thus, First Mercury was responsible for providing a defense 
for Shawmut and Shepard.154 
Other jurisdictions have followed similar reasoning. The 
Southern District of Texas in Gilbane Building Co. v. Empire 
Steel Erectors, L.P.155 couched its discussion of the duty to 
defend under “caused, in whole or in part, by” language in 
the concept of fault: 
The new [2004 ISO] CG 20 10 additional insured endorsement 
requires the injury to be “caused, in whole or in part, by” the named 
insured in order for coverage to be triggered. Thus, in the absence 
of fault of the named insured, there should be no coverage for an 
additional insured.156 
 
 152. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 174. 
 153. First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 660 F. 
App’x. 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’g 48 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D. Conn. 2014). I again note 
that the court in Burlington confronted the question of the insurer’s duty to 
indemnify, rather than defend, although the concept of partial fault is pertinent 
to each. 
 154. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 175. 
 155. No. H-08-1707, 2010 WL 4791493 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010). 
 156. Id. at *6 (citing PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER 
AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:63.50 (2010)). 
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The underlying suit arose when Michael Parr, an 
employee of Empire Steel Erectors, L.P. (Empire Steel) fell 
off a ladder at a muddy construction site and was injured.157 
Mr. Parr sued the general contractor, Gilbane Building 
Company (Gilbane), alleging negligence.158 Under their 
contract, Empire Steel was required to secure a CGL 
insurance policy naming Gilbane as an additional insured, 
which was obtained from Admiral Insurance Company 
(Admiral).159 
Gilbane tendered its defense and indemnification to 
Empire Steel and Admiral.160 Admiral denied the tender and 
disclaimed coverage, asserting that Gilbane was not an 
additional insured under the policy, and that, even assuming 
arguendo that Gilbane were an additional insured, the 
complaint failed to explicitly allege that Empire Steel was at 
fault, and in fact alleged that Mr. Parr’s “injuries were 
brought about to occur, directly and proximately by reason of 
the negligence of [Gilbane].”161 
Again, the Southern District of Texas discussed the 
general contractor’s additional insured status under a lens of 
fault, declaring that where fault may exist on behalf of the 
named insured, an insurer’s duty to defend is triggered.162 
Although Parr’s complaint alleged that Gilbane was directly 
and proximately at fault for failing to provide working 
elevators at all times despite heavy rainfall and muddy 
conditions, the petition also stated Mr. Parr was indeed 
employed by Empire Steel and performing work under a 
 
 157. Id. at *1. 
 158. Id. Gilbane ultimately settled with Parr for $165,000. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at *2. 
 161. Admiral Disclaimer Letter at 4, Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493 (S.D. 
Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) (No. H-08-1707) (modification in original) (quoting Parr 
Complaint, Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010)); see 
also Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493, at *2, 6. 
 162. See Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493, at *6–7. 
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contract with Gilbane, and that Mr. Parr’s injuries occurred 
while he was walking down the ladder in muddy boots.163 
Thus, Admiral’s duty to defend Gilbane as an additional 
insured was triggered where an inference could be drawn 
that Parr was at least partly at fault for causing his own 
injuries by failing to clean his boots prior to his descent.164 
In James G. Davis Construction Corp. v. Erie Insurance 
Exchange,165 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
confronted the ISO’s 2004 additional insured endorsement 
language in this context of an insurer’s duty to defend as an 
issue of first impression. On a home construction project in 
Washington, D.C., James G. Davis Construction Corporation 
(Davis) was hired as the general contractor.166 Davis enlisted 
the help of several subcontractors for the project, including 
Tricon Construction, Inc. (Tricon) to install drywall, 
insulation, and fireplaces on site,167 as well as American 
Mechanical Services, who in turn sub-subcontracted with 
Frost Fire Insulation (Frost Fire) to perform air conditioning 
and insulation work.168As per the subcontract agreement 
between Tricon and Davis, Tricon was required to obtain a 
CGL policy of insurance naming Davis as an additional 
insured.169 
With a general contractor, several subcontractors, and 
even sub-subcontractors, James G. Davis Construction Corp. 
is a reminder of the overlapping liabilities and 
responsibilities involved in construction litigation and the 
intricate insurance coverage scenarios that logically follow. 
The underlying tort litigation arose from injuries sustained 
by two Frost Fire employees when a scaffold, owned and 
 
 163. Id. at *6. 
 164. Id. at *7. 
 165. 126 A.3d 753 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015). 
 166. Id. at 755. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 756. 
 169. Id. at 755. 
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installed by Tricon, collapsed while they were performing 
their work.170 The injured employees alleged one count of 
negligence against Tricon and another against Davis, 
contending that they had Davis’ assurance that the 
scaffolding was safe and secure, and were in fact authorized 
to use Tricon’s scaffold at the time of collapse.171 Davis 
tendered its defense to Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), who 
had provided Tricon with the insurance required under the 
subcontract agreement.172 Erie declined to provide Davis 
with a defense, arguing that Davis was not an additional 
insured where the claims arose from its own negligence.173 
With Maryland courts yet to construe an interpretation 
of the “caused, in whole or in part, by” language included in 
the Erie policy, the Court of Special Appeals relied on a 
relatively contemporaneous interpretation of such language 
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.174 The Fourth 
Circuit, relying upon the persuasive authority in Gilbane 
Building Co., concluded that “the language is quite clear that 
coverage is provided for the real estate development 
company, an additional insured, for ‘property damages . . . 
caused in whole or in part by’ the subcontractor.”175 Thus, as 
was the case in Gilbane Bldg. Co., the Fourth Circuit held 
that identical language to that at issue in this matter 
“mean[t] that an insurer has a duty to defend an additional 
insured ‘only if the underlying pleadings allege that’ the 
named insured, ‘or someone acting on its behalf, proximately 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 756–57. 
 172. Id. at 757. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 761 (citing Capital City Real Estate, LLC v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Policy Number: ARTE018240, 788 F.3d 375, 
379–380 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
 175. Id. at 761–62 (citing Capital City Real Estate, LLC v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Policy Number: ARTE018240, 
788 F.3d 375, 379–380 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
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caused’ the injury or damage.”176 
Again, as had been reasoned by the Fifth Circuit in 
Gilbane Building Co., the Fourth Circuit shared in the 
conclusion that the phrase “liability . . . caused, in whole or 
in part, by” included in the additional insured endorsement 
indicated coverage afforded to Davis 
[could not] be limited exclusively to claims of vicarious liability for 
Tricon’s acts. . . . [I]t is unreasonable to interpret the term “liability” 
as used in the 2004 version of the ISO standard form additional 
insured endorsement as referring to “vicarious liability” because 
vicarious liability is an all or nothing proposition and thus a party 
could not be vicariously liable ‘in part’ for the [named insured’s] 
acts. 
· · · · 
Indeed, because vicarious liability is used to impute liability to “an 
innocent third party,” such liability cannot be caused merely “in 
part.” The third party to whom liability is imputed would not be 
“innocent” unless the wrongdoer’s acts caused the liability “in 
whole.” We, therefore, hold that the word liability in the policy at 
issue relates to proximate causation and not vicarious liability.177 
Determining that Davis was indeed an additional 
insured under the Erie policy for liability caused either in 
whole or in part by Tricon’s acts, the Fourth Circuit analyzed 
whether the allegations in the complaint triggered Erie’s 
duty to defend its additional insured.178 Under Maryland 
law, in order for an insurer’s defense obligation to be 
triggered, “the underlying tort suit need only allege action 
that is potentially covered by the policy, no matter how 
attenuated, frivolous, or illogical that allegation may be.”179 
 
 176. Id. at 762 (citing Capital City Real Estate, LLC v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Policy Number: ARTE018240, 788 F.3d 375, 
379–380 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 
589, 598 (5th Cir. 2011))). 
 177. Id. at 762. 
 178. Id. at 762–63. 
 179. Id. at 762 (quoting Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540 (Md. 
1996)). This language closely relates to the language followed in many states, 
including New York, which provides coverage if allegations in the complaint raise 
matters which may be covered, no matter if they are “groundless, false or 
fraudulent.” See, e.g., Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 343 N.E.2d 758, 758 (N.Y. 
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Thus, Erie was required to defend Davis if the allegations in 
the complaint potentially triggered coverage under the Erie 
policy by alleging that Tricon proximately caused the Frost 
Fire employees’ injuries.180 
The complaint in the underlying action asserted that 
both Tricon and Davis fell short of the requisite reasonable 
care “in erecting, positioning, and maintaining the 
scaffolding,” leading to the Frost Fire employees’ injuries.181 
Moreover, both Tricon and Davis were alleged to have been 
the “controlling employer at the construction site” and “had 
general supervisory authority over the construction site 
including the authority to correct safety violations.”182 The 
complaint, in fact, alleged negligence on behalf of Tricon 
alone, Davis alone, and Tricon and Davis together, in 
generating liability for the injuries of the Frost Fire 
employees.183 
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland concluded that had the lower court analyzed 
whether Davis’s liability was alleged to have arisen out of 
Tricon’s ongoing operations, it would have concluded that 
Davis’s liability was alleged to be “caused in whole, or in 
part” by the acts or omissions of Tricon while performing its 
“ongoing operations” for Davis.184 Thus, such a finding would 
have compelled the conclusion that Davis had been sued for 
“‘liability arising out of’ Tricon’s ‘ongoing operations 
performed for’ Davis,” triggering the duty to defend Davis as 
an additional insured.185 
Amidst uncertainty on the question of the named 
insured’s potential liability, with the duty to defend granted 
 
1975). 
 180. James G. Davis Construction Corp., 126 A.3d at 763. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 764. 
 185. Id. 
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such a breadth of application, the case law above suggests 
that the insurer may be without recourse. However, potential 
recourse for insurance companies may rest where torts and 
insurance law overlaps, an area courts are reluctant to 
discuss explicitly. 
IV. POST-BURLINGTON REALITY AND PALSGRAF-IAN STYLE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE ENTERING THE REALM OF INSURANCE LAW 
Despite understandable commentary expressing the 
view that the realms of tort and insurance law should be kept 
separate during the course of litigation, Part IV attempts to 
dispel such legal-fiction in light of Burlington and the 
infiltration of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause across this 
eroding no-man’s land. Recent caselaw in New York 
discussed in this Part has not foreclosed the extension of 
Palsgraf-ian proximate cause beyond the “vacuum of non-
liability,” and it is foreseeable that Burlington may invoke 
sweeping change in the area of risk transfer under 
construction contracts. 
Scholars in insurance law caution of the dangers of 
analogizing to the tort-based conceptions of but-for and 
proximate causation, claiming such comparisons are 
“unhelpful and often extremely misleading in an insurance 
law context.”186 The concept of legal or proximate causation 
in the realm of tort may foreclose liability against actors or 
entities without responsibility for a loss, distribute 
responsibility among various potential causal agents, and 
sever liability for consequences tenuously related to remote 
causes.187 Tools such as proximate cause in tort law 
were created specifically for fault-based inquiry. Using those same 
tools in insurance settings changes the contractual analysis in a 
fundamental way. It opens the door for morality-based decision 
patterns which produce illogical and unpredictable results in a 
 
 186. Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion about Causation in Insurance: Solutions for 
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 970 (2010). 
 187. Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 
569, 570 (1988). 
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contractual sphere. The proximate or dominant cause approach to 
insurance causation . . . advocates choosing the most 
“blameworthy” cause. It borrows heavily from proximate cause 
analysis in tort. There is a marked tendency in cases that adopt a 
dominant cause approach to implicitly assess relative “blame” or 
“fault” to a certain cause of a loss in a way other than as one of a 
faultless series of potential insurance coverage triggers. Coverage 
decisions then get made with reference, implicitly or explicitly, to 
the cause with the greatest relative blameworthiness. Read any 
insurance policy. No clause grants an insured coverage rights based 
on which loss trigger was most at fault in the moral sense of the 
word. The policies grant coverage based on the mere existence of a 
causal event that brought about a “happening” in reality. That is as 
lofty as “cause” is put in the insurance world.188 
It is this dichotomy of insurance and tort that must be 
navigated for every case that calls for insurance coverage to 
ultimately indemnify an insured. However, “[w]hile 
causation is a pervasive problem in torts and not an 
important one in contracts, actions on insurance policies lie 
somewhere between the two.”189 Although the question we 
have analyzed thus far can be viewed as a trigger of coverage 
for defense and indemnity costs in contract law, the trigger 
for additional insured status under “liability caused, in 
whole or in part” language following Burlington is, in 
practice, one of fault or blameworthiness firmly entrenched 
between these spheres.190 As was the case in Burlington, 
although a named insured can undisputedly be the cause-in-
fact that generates a loss, should the named insured’s 
conduct be less at fault, if at all, the blameworthy party and 
its insurer should bear the loss.191 
 
 188. Knutsen, supra note 186, at 971 (footnotes omitted). 
 189. McDowell, supra note 187, at 571. 
 190. Usually a determination as to whether coverage exists or is excluded for 
the named insured’s liability under a policy consists of determining whether the 
behavioral trigger occurred within the language of the policy, and is a question 
not of “‘who is to blame and why’ but merely ‘what happened.’” Knutsen, supra 
note 186, at 969. However, the New York Court of Appeals requirement of fault 
on behalf of the named insured in Burlington prior to assigning additional 
insured status indicates that such a determination is more similar to a question 
of “who is to blame and why?” 
 191. See Burlington Ins. Co. v NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477, 484 (N.Y. 
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Though insurance is arguably “the backbone of the tort 
system, it is not the tort system.”192 Instead, “[i]t is a 
contractually driven loss-spreading mechanism.”193 Courts 
attempt ad nauseam to maintain the separation between the 
parallel realms of tort and insurance law,194 however 
concepts like proximate cause inherently tend to blend them 
together.195 One particularly poignant example is the ethical 
concerns surrounding third-party payment taken in 
conjunction with the insurer’s duty to defend in the tort 
sphere. Although the insurer’s duty to defend an insured 
requires the compensation of an attorney to defend the 
insured in the underlying tort, this attorney is ethically 
required to honor the best interests of his client—the 
insured—and not the carrier.196 Thus, the separation of tort 
and insurance law exaggerates the lack of incentives for both 
the plaintiff and defendant in an underlying tort action to 
present, for example, an intentional conduct argument with 
any gusto, whereby coverage would not exist.197 Such a 
 
2017) (“Although but for [the named insured’s] machine coming into contact with 
the live cable, the explosion would not have occurred and the employee would not 
have fallen or been injured, that triggering act was not the proximate cause of 
the employee’s injuries since [the named insured] was not at fault in operating 
the machine in the manner that led it to touch the live cable.”). 
 192. Knutsen, supra note 186, at 970. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Shoffstall, 119 A.D.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1986) (holding that an insurance company’s interests in the amount of the loss 
from an underlying tort case “are unrelated to the subject matter of the action 
and can in no way be characterized as claims or defenses to the action”). Any 
discussion of coverage is a fiction in the underlying civil litigation, and the jury 
should not hear about those issues, lest it impermissibly sway the fact-finders’ 
decision. These issues are instead discussed in a separate declaratory judgment 
action brought by the insurer, or subsequent direct action by a judgment creditor. 
 195. Knutsen, supra note 186, at 971–72. 
 196. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 n.* (N.Y. 
1981). 
 197. For an interesting example of this point, see Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. 
Cook, 850 N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 2006). The Court in Cook held that a defense 
obligation existed because of allegations in the complaint of “negligently playing 
with a loaded shotgun; negligently pointing that shotgun at the abdomen of the 
decedent; negligently discharging that shot gun [sic] into the decedent’s 
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finding of intentional conduct would not only limit the ability 
of an injured party to receive compensation from an insolvent 
defendant, but alternatively limit the ability of a defendant 
to fulfill a judgment entered against them.198 Despite the 
existence of a broad duty to defend, the inherent lack of 
representation of the insurer’s interests in an underlying tort 
action results in the insurer protecting its interest through 
contemporaneous or subsequent declaratory judgment 
actions in the insurance sphere, based upon the ultimate 
question of indemnity. 
In the aftermath of Burlington, no New York court has 
yet foreclosed the possibility that an insurer’s 
indemnification obligation to a potential additional insured 
may be eliminated on proximate cause grounds where the 
named insured was only tenuously at fault. The first post-
Burlington decision in New York to directly apply its 
 
abdomen”, despite facts consisting of the following: 
[F]our individuals gathered in the kitchen where Barber began 
demanding money from Cook while pounding his fists on the kitchen 
table. Cook, alarmed, drew his gun and demanded that they leave his 
house. Barber apparently laughed at the small size of the pistol, at which 
point Cook withdrew to his bedroom for a larger weapon. He picked up 
a loaded, 12 gauge shotgun and stood in his living room at the far end of 
his pool table. Cook again ordered them to leave the house. Although 
Barber started to head toward the door with his companions, he stopped 
at the opposite end of the pool table, turned to face Cook and told his 
companions to take anything of value, and that he would meet them 
outside because he had some business to attend to. When Barber 
menacingly started advancing toward Cook, Cook warned him that he 
would shoot if he came any closer. Cook aimed his gun toward the lowest 
part of Barber’s body that was not obscured by the pool table—his navel. 
When Barber was about one step away from the barrel of the gun, Cook 
fired a shot into Barber’s abdomen. Barber died later that day at a 
hospital. 
Id. at 1154. While Cook was acquitted of criminal charges involving intentional 
conduct, id., the evidentiary standard in a civil case is much lower. However, 
neither Cook nor the decedent wanted to see the insurance policy removed from 
the equation by arguing intentional conduct. See id. 
 198. The insurer is not without recourse, however, as it can protect its own 
interests separately by “litigating the issue of indemnification in a subsequent 
[or parallel] action in the event of a judgment for plaintiff in the personal injury 
action.” Kaczmarek, 119 A.D.2d at 1002. 
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principles to the broad duty to defend was handed down in 
February 2018, but what was most interesting was its 
position (or lack thereof) on the insurer’s indemnification 
obligation.199 New York’s First Department in Vargas v. City 
of New York, although acknowledging that proximate cause 
is necessary to establish a duty to indemnify,200 remained 
true to New York’s BP A.C. Corp. v. OneBeacon Insurance 
Group,201 and applied the same broad duty to defend in the 
additional insured context as had existed for a named 
insured.202 In essence, where the allegations in the complaint 
raised the possibility of negligent causation by the named 
insured, an insurer cannot avoid its duty to defend an entity 
that was included in the policy as an additional insured, 
unless proximate causation has specifically been 
eliminated.203 
In Vargas, the City of New York (the City) contracted 
with E.E. Cruz & Tully Construction Co., a Joint Venture, 
LLC (Joint Venture) as general contractor for a construction 
project.204 Joint Venture enlisted the help of a painting 
subcontractor, L&L Painting Co., Inc. (L&L) for the project, 
contractually requiring L&L to procure insurance that 
named Joint Venture and the City as additional insureds.205 
 
 199. See Vargas v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.S.3d 415 (App. Div. 2018). 
 200. Id. at 417 (“[I]t was premature to declare that [the insurer] is obliged to 
indemnify the . . . defendants. . . . It has not yet been determined if [the 
subcontractor] was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” (citing Burlington 
Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477 (2017))). 
 201. 871 N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that an insurer’s defense obligation 
is no different for an additional insured as it exists for a named insured on a 
policy). 
 202. Vargas, 71 N.Y.S.3d at 417. 
 203. Until such time as a court severs the causal chain for an entity one-
percent or more at fault, it would seem that the court’s definition of “proximate 
cause” in this context is an all-or-nothing proposition in practice, rather than 
proximate cause in the “Palsgraf-ian” sense. 
 204. Vargas, 71 N.Y.S.3d at 417. 
 205. Id. I have focused my attention on endorsements one through three, which 
required causation beyond the requirement of endorsement four. Id. 
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L&L obtained a CGL policy from Liberty Insurance 
Underwriters Inc. (Liberty) that named Joint Venture and 
the City as additional insureds.206 In turn, L&L sub-
subcontracted with Camabo Industries, Inc. (Camabo).207 
The plaintiff, Robert Vargas, was an employee of 
Camabo who alleged injuries from lead dust exposure that 
occurred while working on the City’s project.208 Liberty 
contended that under additional insured endorsements one 
through three in the policy issued to L&L, the City was not 
considered an additional insured because Vargas’s injury 
had not been caused by L&L or those acting on its behalf.209 
The New York Supreme Court held that Liberty was 
required to defend and indemnify the City defendants in the 
underlying action.210 Taking issue with that holding, New 
York’s First Department Appellate Division held that “it was 
premature to declare that Liberty is obliged to indemnify the 
City defendants” because it had “not yet been determined if 
L&L was the proximate cause of [Vargas’s] injury.”211 
Instead, the Appellate Division held that “[t]he limitations in 
[the] endorsements . . . do not vitiate Liberty’s duty to 
defend, because the . . . complaint brings the insurance claim 
at least ‘potentially within the protection purchased.’”212 The 
complaint alleged “that all defendants—which includes 
L&L—operated, maintained, managed, and controlled the 
job site” and “also . . . that all defendants were negligent and 
failed to provide a safe job site.”213 Therefore, the court held 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Vargas v. City of New York, No. 154323/13, 2016 WL 184531, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2016). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Vargas, 71 N.Y.S.3d at 417. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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“it is possible that plaintiff’s injury was caused by L&L.”214 
The court in Vargas determined that where the 
possibility of causation exists on the face of the pleadings, the 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language requires an insurer 
to fulfill their defense obligation for an additional insured 
unless, as was the case in Burlington, proximate cause has 
been ruled out entirely. But how far exactly would a court be 
willing to apply the Palsgraf-ian brand of proximate cause 
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Burlington? 
The fact that New York’s First Department expressly 
took issue with the lower court’s premature finding of a duty 
to indemnify is important and should not be overlooked. 
Although Vargas solidified that New York courts interpret 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” to require a defense 
obligation of a potential additional insured as the majority of 
jurisdictions have, the decision makes it possible215 that a 
duty to indemnify potential additional insureds may be 
eliminated where the named insureds may be one-percent or 
more at fault.216 
Following Vargas, New York’s First Department doubled 
down on its application of the Palsgraf-ian proximate cause 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Admittedly improbable, but possible, nonetheless. See generally DUMB 
AND DUMBER (New Line Cinema 1994) (“So you’re telling me there’s a chance?” 
(statement by Lloyd Christmas)). 
 216. See BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:334 (positing that the “1%” 
fault of the named insured only establishes the initial broad defense obligation 
and admitting that, beyond that, the additional insured triggering language 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” poses some problems). I contend that one such 
problem as referred to by Bruner and O’Connor is the exact extent to which 
proximate cause may limit small percentages of fault of the named insured. But 
see TURNER, supra note 22, § 42:4 (“[F]or there to be insurance for the additional 
insured named in the endorsement, the named insured must be negligent at least 
in part. . . . Thus, if the additional insured can show that the named insured was 
as little as 1% of the cause of the claimant’s injury or damage, this requirement 
of the endorsement is met. This may not prove to be a very formidable obstacle.”). 
Turner, like many insurance law commentators, turns a blind eye to the realities 
that exist between tort and insurance law in practice. Although intended to be 
kept separate, there is blending and blurring of the lines between these spheres, 
including the concept of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause invading insurance law. 
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principles of Burlington in Hanover Insurance Co. v. 
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.,217 this time within 
the vacuum of non-liability that was present in the original 
New York Court of Appeals Burlington decision.218 In only 
the second application of Burlington’s holding within the 
New York court system, it is crystal clear that where there is 
no theory of liability that applies to an insurance company’s 
named insured, there is no defense or indemnification 
obligation that extends to the additional insured under the 
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language.219 
The Hanover case, unlike the other cases that have been 
discussed so far, had nothing to do with construction 
contracts. In Hanover, Michael Green was injured following 
a slip and fall alleged to have occurred while he was working 
in his capacity as a security guard employed by Protection 
Plus Security Consultants, Inc. (Protection Plus) at a facility 
owned by Manhattan School of Music.220 Protection Plus 
contracted with the Manhattan School of Music to provide 
security services and, pursuant to that contract, was 
obligated to maintain liability insurance that provided 
coverage for the Manhattan School as an additional 
insured.221 Protection Plus procured a CGL insurance policy 
from Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (PIIC) 
that named Manhattan School as an additional insured, but 
“only with respect to liability for bodily injury caused, in 
whole or in part, by (1) [Protection Plus’s] acts or omissions; 
or (2) [t]he acts or omissions of those acting on [Protection 
 
 217. 73 N.Y.S.3d 549 (App. Div. 2018). The facts in this case are more 
comparable to the facts as they existed in the original Burlington decision, and 
do not shed as much light on the potential reach of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause 
in the insurance industry. 
 218. For more discussion regarding the vacuum of non-liability, see discussion 
supra Part II. 
 219. See Hanover, 73 N.Y.S.3d at 549. 
 220. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Hanover, 73 N.Y.S.3d 549 (No. 
154006/14). 
 221. Id. 
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Plus’s] behalf; in the performance of [Protection Plus’s] 
ongoing operations for [Manhattan School].”222 
New York’s First Department reversed the lower court’s 
decision, which had held that “Philadelphia Indemnity ha[d] 
a duty to indemnify Manhattan School, but only to the extent 
that it is determined to be vicariously liable for the negligent 
acts of Protection Plus.”223 Instead, the “caused, in whole or 
in part” language was interpreted by the First Department 
to conclude that “coverage is extended to an additional 
insured only when the damages are the result of the named 
insured’s negligence or some other act or omission,” and “the 
acts or omissions of Protection Plus were not a proximate 
cause of the security guard’s injury,” but “[r]ather, the sole 
proximate cause of the injury was the additional insured, 
and thus coverage is not available to the Manhattan School 
under defendant’s policy.”224 
One recent decision rendered by the Eastern District of 
New York, United States Underwriters Insurance Company 
v. Image By J&K, LLC, provides an interesting gloss on 
decisions like Burlington and Hanover, which fall within the 
vacuum of non-liability.225 There, District Judge Margo 
Brodie framed the vacuum of non-liability existing in 
Burlington in terms of the necessity—or rather lack 
thereof—of a court’s weighing of the merits.226 Judge Brodie 
opined that “the challenge before the New York Court of 
Appeals [in Burlington] did not implicate the merits of the 
underlying action.”227 After all, an insurer’s duty to defend 
 
 222. Id. at 24 (alterations in original). 
 223. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., No. 154006/2014, 2015 
WL 6920605, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015), rev’d, 73 N.Y.S.3d 549 (App. Div. 2018). 
 224. Hanover, N.Y.S.3d at 549–50 (citing Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit 
Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 2017)). 
 225. No. 16-CV-6176, 2018 WL 4055298, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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exists even for those claims entirely devoid of merit.228 
Rather, “[a]t most, the New York Court of Appeals 
determined the allocation of fault between the named 
insured and the potential additional insureds as to any 
liability arising from the underlying action.”229 In doing so, 
Judge Brodie acknowledged the weighing of fault that plays 
a role in Palsgraf-ian proximate cause determinations styled 
under Burlington. Should the balance weigh in favor of the 
elimination of the named insured’s liability, then there could 
potentially be the elimination of additional insured status for 
an upstream entity. 
It is readily apparent that any battle involving New York 
courts constraining proximate cause in light of a named 
insured’s tenuous fault will not be fought in a case focused 
on this threshold question of an insurer’s duty to defend. The 
duty to defend an additional insured under the ISO’s 2004 
language is triggered merely by allegations proffered against 
the named insured in the complaint.230 Thus, any allegation 
of fault posited against the named insured triggers this 
defense obligation until such time as the court has deemed 
that either the insurer is without an obligation to indemnify 
for the loss, or the entity claiming additional insured status 
is not, in fact, an additional insured under the policy. 
Instead, this battle will likely be waged in an insurer’s 
declaratory judgment action on facts in which the loss would 
be entirely covered by either the “upstream” entity’s own 
carrier, or the subcontractor’s carrier under a theory of 
additional insured status.231 Although tension exists 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. (citing Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 
2017) (“[I]f the parties desire a different allocation of risk, they are free to 
negotiate language that serves their interests.”)). 
 230. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:334. 
 231. To contrast this view, Randy Maniloff has commented that 
most coverage claims are resolved without a declaratory judgment and 
involve determinations of coverage for underlying claims that were 
settled without the benefit of a trial or other fact-finding mechanism. 
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regarding a court’s consideration of insurance coverage while 
in the tort sphere of litigation,232 such considerations are 
part and parcel in insurance litigation that follows the 
underlying tort determination.233 Thus, a determination 
 
Thus, the question of just who was at fault for an injury may never have 
an opportunity to be determined by a neutral arbiter. . . . Considering 
that underlying complaints are sometimes artfully drafted with 
insurance coverage fully in mind, these consequences of the revisions to 
ISO’s additional insured endorsements may not be so unintentional after 
all, at least not from plaintiff’s counsel’s perspective. For these reasons, 
while ISO’s newest version of form CG 20 10 is a nice effort, it may fall 
victim to circumstances beyond its control. 
Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-9. I suggest that, in the years since Maniloff 
published his May 2004 piece (prior to implementation of the ISO’s July 2004 
revisions), the court’s use of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause provides a reason for 
declaratory judgment actions to sever the chain of causation and eliminate a 
costly duty to defend. Maniloff’s piece does not mention the concept of proximate 
cause. Had Maniloff been aware of the application of Palsgraf-ian proximate 
cause to this language, he may very well have thought differently of the use of 
declaratory judgment in such a scenario. 
 232. Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideology, 58 MOD. L. REV. 820, 831 
(1995) (“[I]f comparative insurability is to be used as a factor influencing tort 
liability in all cases . . ., by what criteria are we to evaluate who is the ‘better’ or 
‘cheaper’ insurer, especially given that both sides will nearly always be able to 
insure at some price?”). 
 233. Courts routinely discuss the availability of coverage within the 
automobile accident context, where public policy in the third-party liability 
sphere errs on the side of providing coverage for the injuries to innocent victims. 
See Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp. v. Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp., 319 N.E.2d 
182, 184–85 (N.Y. 1974) (requiring a rental car agency’s insurer to cover injuries 
sustained in an accident on a theory of constructive consent for a technically non-
permissive user of the vehicle because of New York’s public policy that “one 
injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle should have recourse to a 
financially responsible defendant”); Thrasher v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co., 225 N.E.2d 
503, 508 (N.Y. 1967) (imposing a heavy burden on an insurer to establish lack of 
cooperation for denying coverage in a third-party auto liability case because “the 
policy of this State [is] that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents be 
recompensed for the injuries inflicted upon them”). Although we confront a 
question as to which insurer should ultimately pay as opposed to the Hobson’s 
choice of whether a single insurer should pay or not, it is important that in 
insurance law, courts routinely make these types of determinations while 
considering the availability of coverage. A New York court would only remove the 
obligations of the subcontractor’s insurer through a theory of the lack of Palsgraf-
ian proximate cause if the loss can entirely be covered by another policy. 
Otherwise, the court would err on keeping both policies in play, so as to either 
split the costs as concurrent primary coverage, or determine priority of coverage 
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based upon blameworthiness could potentially lead a court 
to favor imposing the indemnification obligation on the 
“upstream” entity’s carrier, where the “downstream” 
subcontractor was only tenuously at fault for the loss, 
provided the loss is fully covered by either insurer. 
As an example, assume the following facts. A general 
contractor (General) enters into a contract with a 
subcontractor (Sub-C) to clear a building of its contents prior 
to its demolition by General. The contract requires that Sub-
C obtain a CGL policy naming General as an additional 
insured for “liability caused, in whole or in part, by” Sub-C’s 
acts or omissions. General had scheduled the demolition for 
March 24, and informed Sub-C that it was safe to perform 
the task of clearing the building through March 23. On 
March 22, Sub-C informed General that its work was 
completed as of that day. Without communicating with Sub-
C, General decided to proceed with demolition on March 23 
instead of March 24. On March 23, Joe Employee, who was 
employed by Sub-C, arrived for work because Sub-C failed to 
inform him that the work was completed, and Joe Employee 
is killed when the building is imploded. Although Sub-C may 
be at fault for failing to communicate with Joe Employee that 
the work within the building was completed, no court would 
find such a failure to communicate as a proximate cause of 
the death, which was ultimately caused by General’s failure 
to communicate the change in the date of demolition. 
The allegations of Joe Employee’s Estate in the ensuing 
wrongful death complaint against General234 may very well 
 
by labelling one as primary and the other as excess coverage. See BP Air 
Conditioning Corp. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 871 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (N.Y. 2007). 
 234. Sub-C itself would be protected from suit by Joe Employee’s Estate under 
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW §§ 10, 11 (McKinney 2018), which provides protections 
for employers against lawsuits brought for “death from injury arising out of and 
in the course of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury . . . .” 
It is extremely important to understand the ramifications of the ISO’s July 2004 
revisions in light of workers’ compensation laws. See Maniloff, supra note 22, at 
M.23-7 (“The plaintiff in an underlying tort case giving rise to potential 
additional insured coverage is often an employee of the named insured. However, 
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imply that the death resulted from Sub-C’s negligent failure 
to communicate to its employees that work in a building to 
be imploded was complete, while also including allegations, 
inter alia, of negligent failure to communicate the shift in 
demolition schedule on behalf of General. Under such 
circumstances, the insurer would initially be required to 
provide a defense to General as a potential additional 
insured, given the allegations of possible liability for both 
General and Sub-C235 in the complaint. However, if the 
insurer filed a parallel declaratory judgment action236 to 
judicially determine the issue of the general contractor’s 
status as an additional insured, the court would be required 
to analyze proximate causation regarding the conduct of Sub-
C. 
The New York Court of Appeals in Burlington applied 
proximate cause in the Palsgraf-ian sense, recognizing that 
the law could “arbitrarily decline[] to trace a series of events 
beyond a certain point” for reason “of convenience, of public 
policy, [or] a rough sense of justice.”237 Under the factual 
 
because of the workmen’s compensation bar [on recovery], the plaintiff’s 
complaint may not allege any negligence on the part of his employer (named 
insured), even if it in fact existed. In this situation, because the duty to defend is 
typically determined based solely on the allegations contained in the underlying 
complaint, the additional insured may be denied a defense because the 
underlying complaint is devoid of any allegations that the plaintiff’s injury was 
caused ‘in whole or in part by your [named insured’s] acts or omissions; or the 
acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf,’ as required by form CG 20 10 07 
04.” (second alteration in original)). 
 235. Again, N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2018) does not 
eliminate the liability of an employer, but rather replaces any underlying liability 
with liability as defined in N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2018). 
Thus, Sub-C may potentially have underlying liability as alleged in the 
complaint, despite such liability being replaced for the purposes of compensation 
to Joe Employee’s Estate on behalf of Sub-C under New York’s workers’ 
compensation law. 
 236. For estoppel reasons, counsel is reminded to name the injured party as a 
defendant in the action as well, or else risk re-litigating the nonbinding 
determination with the party unrepresented in the original declaratory judgment 
action. 
 237. Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477, 482 (N.Y. 2017) 
(citing Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149–50 (N.Y. 
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scenario above, such Palsgraf-ian proximate cause would 
allow a court to judicially determine that, although Sub-C is 
tenuously at fault for failing to communicate with its 
employee, its omission was not the proximate cause of Joe 
Employee’s death. Such a determination would mean that 
there was no triggering of additional insured status for 
General under the holding in Burlington, since the named 
insured’s omission was not a proximate cause of the death as 
a matter of law.238 Instead, General would be required to 
tender its defense and indemnity to its own insurer for the 
underlying action brought by Joe Employee’s Estate. 
Whether the court arrived at this determination by way of a 
“rough sense of justice” or because of “public policy” concerns, 
the most blameworthy party would be held accountable 
through its own insurer. 
Although not quite as extreme as the above hypothetical, 
a recent New York Fourth Department decision, Pioneer 
Central School District v. Preferred Mutual Insurance Co. 
helps to augment the limits placed on Burlington’s Palsgraf-
ian proximate cause determination along a similar vein.239 
In Pioneer Central, J&K Kleanerz of WNY, LLC (Kleanerz), 
contracted with Pioneer Central School District and Pioneer 
Middle School (collectively, Pioneer) to provide janitorial 
services.240 As part of that contract, Kleanerz was required 
to “indemnify Pioneer in actions for bodily injury ‘arising or 
resulting from any act, omission, neglect or misconduct of 
 
1978) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) 
(Andrews, J., dissenting))). 
 238. See Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 483–84 (“While . . . interpreting the phrases 
[‘arising out of’ and ‘caused . . . by’] differently does not compel the conclusion 
that the endorsement incorporates a negligence requirement (citation omitted), 
it does compel us to interpret ‘caused, in whole or in part’ to mean more than ‘but 
for’ causation. That interpretation, coupled with the endorsement’s application 
to acts or omissions that result in liability, supports our conclusion that 
proximate cause is required here.” (citations omitted)). 
 239. No. 1067, 2018 WL 4845825 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 5, 2018). 
 240. Id. at *1. 
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[Kleanerz].’”241 Kleanerz procured an insurance policy 
through Preferred Mutual Insurance Company (Preferred 
Mutual) that named Pioneer “as an additional insured for 
bodily injury ‘caused, in whole or in part, by’ the ‘acts or 
omissions’ of Kleanerz or of those acting on Kleanerz’s 
behalf.”242 
While leaving the Pioneer premises, a Kleanerz 
employee, Dawn Ayers, slipped on snow or ice in the Pioneer 
Middle School parking lot and sustained injuries.243 After 
Ms. Ayers filed suit against Pioneer to recover for her 
injuries, Pioneer filed a third-party action against 
Kleanerz.244 Additionally, Pioneer filed this declaratory 
judgment action against Preferred Mutual, asserting that 
the insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify them in 
Ms. Ayers’ underlying lawsuit.245 
In concluding that Pioneer did not qualify as an 
additional insured under the Preferred Mutual policy, the 
Fourth Department noted that “it is undisputed that 
Kleanerz was not responsible for clearing ice and snow from 
the parking lot and that Ayers’s fall resulted from her 
slipping on the ice or snow.”246 The court stated Pioneer 
should not be afforded the status of additional insured under 
the policy where Kleanerz’s instructions to exit out a certain 
door “merely furnished the occasion for the injury” by 
“fortuitously plac[ing Ayers] in a location or position in 
which . . . [an alleged] separate instance of negligence acted 
independently upon [her] to produce harm.”247 Therefore, 
 
 241. Id. (alteration in original). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. (quoting Hain v. Jamison, 68 N.E.3d 1233 (N.Y. 2016)); see also Hain 
v. Jamison, 68 N.E.3d 1233, 1238 (N.Y. 2016) (“Proximate cause is, at its core, a 
uniquely fact-specific determination, and ‘[d]epending upon the nature of the 
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Preferred Mutual had no indemnity obligation to Pioneer 
“and consequently no duty to defend [Pioneer] in the pending 
[Ayers] action.”248 
In Pioneer, it is certainly noteworthy that the Fourth 
Department placed the duty of snow removal outside of the 
discussion as an undisputed fact.249 However, this falls 
entirely short of those cases, like Burlington and Hanover, 
that find themselves in the vacuum of non-liability. There, it 
was a party’s “liability” that was undisputed. In Pioneer, the 
court, in essence, chose to weigh comparative fault between 
parties in similar fashion to the framing of the issue by 
District Judge Brodie in United States Underwriters 
Insurance Company v. Image By J&K, LLC. This was not a 
merit-based determination in Pioneer, but rather one based 
entirely on the comparative fault of a party merely 
“furnish[ing] the occasion for injury” and a party failing to 
clear snow and ice from a parking lot despite its duty to do 
so.250 As caselaw continues to accumulate, it is entirely 
plausible to anticipate a gradual expansion of this fault-
based decision-making approach to Palsgraf-ian proximate 
cause under Burlington.251 
V. CONCLUSION 
The additional insured endorsement within any CGL 
 
case, a variety of factors may be relevant in assessing legal cause’. Such factors 
include, among other things . . .public policy considerations regarding the scope 
of liability.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 248. Pioneer, 2018 WL 4845825, at *2 (alterations in original) (quoting Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (N.Y. 1991)). 
 249. Id. at *1. 
 250. Pioneer, 2018 WL 4845825, at *1. 
 251. But see Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Alma Tower, LLC, No. 7433, 2018 WL 
5259566, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 23, 2018) aff’g, No. 159286/2014, 2017 WL 
3438141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 2017) (contrasting with the Fourth Department 
in Pioneer, New York’s First Department holds that the mere existence of an 
employer/employee relationship between claimant and named insured was 
enough to trigger “a reasonable possibility” that the named insured “may have 
proximately caused the underlying injury”). 
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policy plays a crucial role in the construction industry. 
Property owners and general contractors relying upon these 
endorsements in policies issued to “downstream” 
subcontractors must be aware of the current landscape of 
coverage for additional insureds, and specifically that courts 
have interpreted the language “caused, in whole or in part, 
by” as requiring proximate cause. While courts have broadly 
applied the insurer’s defense obligation to potential 
additional insureds where liability on behalf of the 
“downstream” named insured is uncertain, the New York 
Court of Appeals, citing Palsgraf-ian proximate cause, has 
limited the scope of this language for purposes of an insurer’s 
duty to indemnify, severing the chain of causation. Although 
the Court of Appeals in Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC 
Transit Authority was not required to determine the full 
extent to which the concept of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause 
may bleed from the tort sphere to insurance law, decisions 
like Vargas v. City of New York certainly have not foreclosed 
a court’s severing of legal causation in light of a named 
insured’s tenuous fault. 
To be sure, existing insurance case law has solely used 
proximate cause to sever the chain of legal causation where 
the named insured lacked fault within the “vacuum of non-
liability,” resembling a traditional contract trigger. However, 
cases like Pioneer Central School District blur the line 
between this vacuum of non-liability and the type of fault-
based determinations required under Palsgraf-ian 
proximate cause. The invocation of Palsgraf in the realm of 
insurance raises questions as to the ultimate scope of its 
application. Albeit unlikely, if given the appropriate 
combination of facts and insurance coverage, blameworthy 
general contractors and property owners should take heed 
knowing that Palsgraf-ian proximate cause in the realm of 
insurance law may allow a court to sever the legal chain of 
causation beyond traditional insurance triggers. 
